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IT IS A  well-known  fact that inventory  disinvestment  can account  for 
much of the movement  in output during recessions.  Almost one-half of 
the shortfall in output, averaged over the five interwar business  cycles, 
can be accounted  for by inventory  disinvestment,  and the proportion 
has been even larger for postwar recessions.'  A lesser-known fact is that 
corporate  profits,  and  therefore  internal-finance  flows,  are  also  ex- 
tremely  procyclical  and tend to lead the cycle.  Wesley  Mitchell finds 
that the percentage change in corporate income over the business  cycle 
is several times greater than that in any other macroeconomic  series in 
his study.2 Robert Lucas lists the high conformity and large variation of 
corporate income  as one of the seven  main qualitative features  of the 
business  cycle.3  The volatility  of internal finance,  which  is also  com- 
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75 76  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
monly referred to as cash flow, continues  to be a salient feature of post- 
war cycles. 
This paper links these two stylized facts by examining whether fluc- 
tuations of internal finance are an important cause of changes in inven- 
tory investment.  Our exploration is motivated by a rapidly growing body 
of theoretical research arguing that changes in either internal finance or 
net worth will affect firm behavior if the markets for external finance are 
imperfect.  Although most previous  empirical work in this area has fo- 
cused on fixed investment,  the dramatic cyclical fluctuations in both in- 
ventory investment  and internal finance suggest that efforts to examine 
their possible  link are overdue. 
When capital markets are imperfect,  fluctuations of internal finance 
should affect all components  of investment.  We argue, however,  that in- 
ventories  should be especially  sensitive  to such  imperfections.  In re- 
sponse  to a negative  shock to internal finance,  financially constrained 
firms will reduce their accumulation of all assets,  with the effect on each 
asset  determined by its relative  liquidation and adjustment costs.  Be- 
cause inventory investment has low adjustment costs,  its share of a de- 
cline in total investment  caused  by the contraction  of internal finance 
will be disproportionately large relative to fixed investment or other uses 
of funds (research and development,  for example). 
While the modern literature on inventories  typically excludes  finan- 
cial effects,  the connection  between  internal finance and inventory  in- 
vestment  may help resolve  an empirical puzzle about inventory behav- 
ior.  Numerous  studies  have  found  that production  varies  more than 
sales  and that inventory  investment  is positively  correlated with con- 
temporaneous  sales  shocks.4  Both  results  are  inconsistent  with  the 
production-smoothing  model that predicts  inventories  will buffer pro- 
duction from sales  shocks.  These  findings may arise from an omitted- 
variable bias. The presence  of financing constraints  induces a positive 
correlation  between  inventory  investment  and internal-finance flows. 
When  internal-finance  variables  are excluded  from inventory  invest- 
ment regressions,  the coefficient on contemporaneous  sales may reflect 
the impact of financing constraints, overwhelming any negative correla- 
tion caused by buffer-stock effects alone. 
We test for a linkage between  inventory  investment  and internal fi- 
4.  See, for example,  Blinder (1986b) and the references  provided there. Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari,  and Bruce C. Petersen  77 
nance by estimating a standard inventory investment  model augmented 
by measures  of internal finance. The data are taken from Compustat's 
quarterly "full coverage" files for manufacturing firms. The sample pe- 
riod from 1981 to 1992 contains pronounced swings in inventory invest- 
ment as well  as large fluctuations  in internal finance,  with troughs in 
1982, 1986, and 1991. To our knowledge,  our study is the first work on 
the microfoundations of cyclical firm behavior to employ a data set with 
three  key  features:  (i) firm-level  panel  data,  (ii) high-frequency  data 
(quarterly), and (iii) data covering a major fraction of the aggregate econ- 
omy. The structure of these  data provides  several important methodo- 
logical advantages. 
First,  with firm-level panel data, we  include both fixed firm effects 
and highly disaggregated industry time dummies. The fixed firm effects 
control for the many possible  time-invariant determinants of inventory 
investment  that differ across  firms. The  disaggregated  time  dummies 
control  for  a  wide  range  of  alternative  hypotheses  about  inventory 
movements  that would be observationally  equivalent  in tests based on 
aggregate time-series  data.5 For example,  an alternative explanation to 
our hypothesis  is that cost  or technological  shocks  at the aggregate or 
industry level drive both internal finance and inventory investment.  By 
including industry time dummies to control for these  shocks,  however, 
the influence of cost  shocks  can be disentangled from other variables. 
Indeed, because  cost shocks  at industry or higher levels  of aggregation 
are often invoked to explain cyclical phenomena, we believe the empiri- 
cal approach pursued here is applicable  to a wide  class  of macroeco- 
nomic issues. 
A second feature of our method,  critical to our study and new in the 
literature, is the use of quiacrter-ly  firm data. This innovation is especially 
important for a high-frequency  phenomenon  such as inventory  invest- 
ment; one could miss important cyclical  variations in annual data. Per- 
haps more important, quarterly data increase the number of time-series 
observations.  We can therefore run regressions,  in the time dimension 
of the panel, for very short calendar periods (such as two or three years). 
The cross-sectional  breadth of the data in combination with its high fre- 
quency allows standard panel data techniques to be used to examine in- 
5.  Most of our regressions  include time dummies for each four-digit SIC (standard in- 
dustry classification)  industry.  In contrast,  previous  panel studies  in the financing-con- 
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dividiual  cycles.  We can test directly  Lucas's  assertion  that "business 
cycles  are all alike" and Victor Zarnowitz's  suggestion  that "although 
individual cycles  share important family characteristics,  they are by no 
means all alike."6 
Finally,  our data cover  a large portion of the macroeconomy.  Our 
sample accounts  for over half of aggregate manufacturing inventories. 
This extent  of coverage  enhances  our ability to draw conclusions  rele- 
vant to macroeconomics  as well as microeconomics. 
Turning to our findings, the results show an economically  important 
link between  internal finance and inventory investment.  As in previous 
empirical studies  of financing constraints  on fixed investment,  we test 
across  firms for the heterogeneity  of internal-finance effects  on inven- 
tory investment.  Splitting our sample  by firm size,  we find that small 
firms have larger internal-finance effects  than large firms. However,  in- 
ternal finance is economically  important even for large firms, a finding 
that helps establish the macroeconomic  significance of our findings. We 
also find heterogeneity  in internal-finance effects across time periods. In 
particular, fluctuations in internal finance are more important for inven- 
tories during the 1981-82 recession  than during the  1990-91 recession. 
This finding is consistent with the smaller role played by inventory disin- 
vestment in the most recent recession  relative to the previous recession, 
even  though declines  in internal finance were  pronounced  in both pe- 
riods. The results are robust to the inclusion of additional variables to 
control for expectations,  alternative estimation procedures,  and differ- 
ent specifications  (including measures of access  to external finance). An 
alternative sample split based on bond ratings also provides consistent 
results. 
The next  section  reviews  related literature, discusses  why  internal 
finance is so volatile for the modern corporation, and describes why in- 
ventory  investment  is  likely  to  be  particularly sensitive  to  short-run 
fluctuations in internal finance. Subsequent sections  provide the empiri- 
cal models,  summary statistics,  and regression results. 
Before concluding,  we also discuss  the macroeconomic  implications 
of our findings and a new perspective  on the cyclical  volatility of inven- 
tory  investment.  Because  inventory  investment  accounts  for  such  a 
large fraction of aggregate volatility,  many economists  have argued that 
6.  Lucas (1977, p. 10) and Zarnowitz (1992, p. 3). Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari, and Brulce C. Petersen  79 
reducing inventory fluctuations could dampen the business cycle.  How- 
ever,  if financing constraints  play a role in propagating the cycle,  this 
view is incomplete.  Internal-finance shocks that are not absorbed by in- 
ventory investment will affect other components  of investment.  For ex- 
ample,  if firms enter a recession  with unusually low inventory  stocks, 
then the reduction in fixed investment  is likely to be greater. Thus, the 
sum of investment  in all assets  may continue  to be volatile  even  if in- 
ventory  fluctuations  are dampened.  This perspective  helps  to explain 
differences in the composition  of total-investment  shortfalls in previous 
contractions;  in  particular,  we  compare  the  1981-82  and  1990-91 
recessions. 
Inventory  Investment  and Internal  Finance 
This section of the paper motivates the linkage between inventory in- 
vestment  and internal finance.  The hypothesis  consists  of three main 
ideas:  (i) financing constraints  exist  and may be important for a large 
portion of the economy;  (ii) for many firms, and for much of the econ- 
omy,  fluctuations in internal finance are extremely  large over the busi- 
ness cycle; and (iii) financially constrained firms will choose  to absorb a 
disproportionately  large amount of internal-finance shocks  with inven- 
tory (dis)investment.  Each of these ideas is discussed  below, along with 
the findings of some related studies. 
Related  Literature 
The  connection  between  inventory  fluctuations  and  the  business 
cycle  has been a major concern  of macroeconomists  for years,  and for 
good reason. While inventory investment  accounted for less than 1 per- 
cent  of  GNP,  on  average,  between  1959 and  1991, Alan  Blinder and 
Louis Maccini find, in a purely arithmetic sense,  that reductions  in in- 
ventory  investment,  on average,  account  for about 87 percent  of the 
drop in real output in postwar recessions.  Their argument that "the in- 
ventory accelerator created cycles  that otherwise  might not exist" (em- 
phasis added) reflects a central role for inventories  in the theory of the 
business cycle,  dating back at least to the work of Lloyd Metzler.7 
7.  Blinder and Maccini (1991a, p. 73) and Metzler (1941). 80  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
The dramatic role played  by inventories  in macroeconomic  down- 
turns, however,  poses a puzzle when viewed from a microeconomic  per- 
spective.  Standard theory  predicts  that optimizing  firms with convex 
costs will smooth production relative to sales, and, when demand is sto- 
chastic, firms will use inventories as a buffer against temporary demand 
shocks.  Thus,  the  model  predicts  that  inventory  investment  should 
dampen cyclical  fluctuations in output. Most empirical evidence,  how- 
ever, rejects the production smoothing-buffer  stock model, finding that 
production varies more than sales and that the covariance  between  in- 
ventory investment and sales is positive.8 These findings have generated 
research addressing the "excess  volatility" of inventories from a variety 
of perspectives,  including work emphasizing cost shocks,  increasing re- 
turns,  and  firms'  desire  to  avoid  losing  sales  because  of  inventory 
stockouts.9 
An alternative explanation for the volatility of inventories is that capi- 
tal market imperfections can limit firms' access to external finance, lead- 
ing to fluctuations in all types of investment,  including inventories.  This 
link between fluctuations of inventory investment,  internal finance, and 
the availability of external finance has been considered in an earlier liter- 
ature. Paul Kuznets,  in a study of data from the Department of Com- 
merce Quarterly Financial  Reports  (QFR), finds that "[a] firm's ability 
to finance inventory investment without resorting to borrowing is deter- 
mined,  finally,  by  earnings and depreciation  flows  or what  might be 
termed 'internal finance'."  10 
Several  recent  papers have  argued that monetary  policy  can affect 
firms' access  to finance,  which  in turn affects  inventory  investment. 
Benjamin Friedman and Kenneth  Kuttner link monetary policy,  finan- 
cial conditions  (measured by both prices and quantities from financial 
markets),  and  real economic  activity,  including  inventory  behavior. 
Anil Kashyap, Jeremy Stein, and James Wilcox estimate vector autore- 
gressions  with aggregate data and find that financial factors (the prime- 
8.  See Blinder and Maccini (1991a) for references.  Exceptions  include papers by Ghali 
(1987), Fair (1989), Krane and Braun (1991), and Kashyap and Wilcox (1993). 
9.  For example,  Eichenbaum (1989) argues that cost shocks provide firms with incen- 
tives to "bunch" production in periods of low cost.  Ramey (1991) finds evidence  of declin- 
ing marginal costs  that would also  motivate  production  bunching.  Blinder and Maccini 
(199la)  argue that production  may vary more than sales  if firms follow  (S,s)  inventory 
rules. 
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commercial paper spread and the mix of bank loans and commercial pa- 
per) have  a significant correlation  with inventory  investment.'1  Mark 
Gertler and Simon Gilchrist, using time-series data from the QFR aggre- 
gated separately for small and large manufacturing firms, compare the 
output and inventory response  to monetary shocks  across the two size 
classes.  They find that small firms "play a surprisingly prominent role in 
the slowdown  of aggregate inventory demand" after monetary contrac- 
tions,  and they argue that this result is due to capital market imperfec- 
tions faced by small firms.  12 Finally, Kashyap, Owen Lamont, and Stein 
examine  three  separate  cross-sections  of  annual  manufacturing-firm 
data. They find that a stock measure of liquidity (cash plus marketable 
securities) is significant in explaining the inventory growth of firms with- 
out bond ratings in the 1982 cross-section  but is not significant for firms 
with bond ratings. The liquidity stock variable is not significant for any 
category of firms in cross-sections  after 1982.'1 
One difference  between  the paper by Gertler and Gilchrist and the 
one by Kashyap,  Lamont,  and Stein is that the former uses  aggregate 
time-series  data while the latter examines  cross-sections  of firms. Both 
of these  empirical approaches  differ from ours since  we exploit  panel 
data on firms, which provide the advantages discussed  in the introduc- 
tion. In addition, our study focuses  on fluctuations in the flow of internal 
finance over  the cycle,  while  the other two  papers are primarily con- 
cerned with the effects of monetary policy and firms' access  to external 
finance,  particularly bank finance.  We  also  find more  pervasive  evi- 
dence of a link between financing constraints and inventory investment: 
our results  indicate economically  important effects  of internal finance 
not just for small firms but also for large firms. 
Pr-esence  of  Financing  Constr-aints 
Research on capital markets provides several reasons to believe  that 
many, perhaps most, firms face a financing hierarchy, in which external 
finance is substantially more expensive  (if available at all) than internal 
1  1.  See Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and Kashyap,  Stein, and Wilcox (1993). 
12.  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994, p. 311). This article also presents results showing that 
the r  atio of cash flow to interest expense (which the authors interpret as a proxy for balance 
sheet conditions) affects inventory investment for small firms but not for large firms. 
13.  Kashyap,  Lamont, and Stein (1994). 82  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
finance. Flotation costs,  bankruptcy costs,  and distortionary taxes cre- 
ate  such a hierarchy.  In addition,  theoretical  work has demonstrated 
that asymmetric  information between  firms and potential  suppliers of 
external finance can cause adverse selection  problems in equity markets 
and adverse  selection  and moral hazard problems in debt markets. 14 In 
theory,  these  problems create a wedge,  which may be very large, be- 
tween the cost of internal and external finance. In some cases,  firms may 
be completely  rationed in markets for external finance. Many recent em- 
pirical studies have found evidence  that supports the presence  of finan- 
cing constraints for a substantial fraction of firms in the United  States 
and other countries.'5  These  studies include both reduced-form regres- 
sions of fixed investment  on internal finance as well as Euler-equation 
investigations  of firms' investment behavior. Several theoretical papers 
extend the significance of financing constraints to macroeconomics,  ar- 
guing that such constraints  can play an important role in propagating 
business  cycles.  16 
Financing constraints are not expected  to affect all firms equally or to 
be invariant over time. Indeed, testing for the possible  heterogeneity  of 
financing constraints across firms has become  a dominant theme in the 
literature. There are several reasons to believe that small firms may face 
greater costs in accessing  external finance than large firms. Public infor- 
mation on small firms is less available, leading to greater asymmetric in- 
formation and more severe  adverse  selection  and moral hazard prob- 
lems.  Small firms rely more heavily  on bank debt than large firms, and 
they rarely issue corporate bonds or commercial paper. For most small 
firms, bank debt may be the only option available to replace lost internal 
finance. 
Even  many large firms are likely  to find it costly,  perhaps prohibi- 
tively so, to replace lost internal finance during a recession  with publicly 
traded debt. Charles Calomiris, Charles Himmelberg, and Paul Wachtel 
provide evidence  showing that very few  manufacturing firms have ac- 
cess  to both commercial  paper, the only publicly traded form of short- 
14.  See, for example,  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Myers and Majluf (1984), and the sur- 
vey by Gertler (1988). 
15.  For example,  see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Gilchrist (1989), Dever- 
eux  and Schiantarelli  (1990),  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  and Scharfstein  (1991),  Whited  (1992), 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), and Dorothy Petersen (1993). 
16.  See, for example, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989). Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari,  and Bruce C. Petersen  83 
term debt,  and corporate  bonds.'7 They  find that only  approximately 
8 percent of Compustat firms have commercial-paper programs. These 
firms are very large (with mean quarterly sales exceeding  $1.5 billion), 
and they have very high bond ratings. Another 12 percent of Compustat 
firms issues  bonds but does not have commercial-paper programs, and 
these firms typically have lower bond ratings. 
In general,  external finance appears to be strongly procyclical.  Ca- 
lomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel find that commercial-paper issuance 
is procyclical at the firm level.  George Perry and Charles Schultze pres- 
ent evidence  showing that short-term credit flows are negative  around 
the troughs of three of the last four recessions.'8  These  facts  suggest 
that, in the aggregate, short-term debt does not offset reductions in inter- 
nal finance during recessions. 
If firms must pay a large premium for new debt or equity,  or if they 
are  rationed  in  external  credit  markets,  internal-finance  flows  from 
profits and depreciation  allowances  provide an important, perhaps es- 
sential,  source of finance for all kinds of investment.  Internal finance is 
the largest source of funds for U.S.  corporations. 19  In addition, a major- 
ity of public firms do not pay dividends  (56 percent of Compustat firms 
in 1990), suggesting the prevalence  of binding financial constraints.  In- 
vestment  activities  for such firms are likely to vary with their flow of 
internal funds. Furthermore, because  cuts in dividends appear to trans- 
mit negative  signals about a firm's prospects  to financial markets, even 
dividend-paying firms may choose  to curtail investment activities rather 
than reduce dividends when internal finance declines.20 This outcome is 
especially  likely  over  the  short horizons  relevant for cyclical  fluctua- 
tions. 
Volatility of Internal Finance 
Of central importance to the argument in this paper is the fact that 
business income, and therefore internal finance, is volatile over the busi- 
17.  Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1994, p. 36). 
18.  Calomiris,  Himmelberg,  and Wachtel (1994) and Perry and Schultze  (1993, table 
10). Also see Friedman and Kuttner (1993, figure 12). 
19.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, table 1) present QFR statistics showing that 
retained earnings account for 71. 1 percent of sources of funds for all manufacturing firms. 
The percentages  are higher for small firms. 
20.  See, for example,  Lintner (1956) and Dielman and Oppenheimer (1984). 84  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
ness  cycle.  Mitchell  has  documented  the  extreme  procyclical  move- 
ments of internal finance, finding that the percentage change in business 
income, the largest component of internal finance, has an amplitude sev- 
eral times greater than any other series in his study.2' Postwar data from 
the QFR  show that business  income continues  to be extremely  volatile 
over  the  cycle.  Real  business  income  fell  47 percent  from  1981:3 to 
1982:4 and then more than doubled in the early stages of the recovery. 
Income fell 39 percent from 1984:2 to 1986:1 as growth slowed  and the 
economy  narrowly avoided a recession.  During the most recent reces- 
sion, business income fell 53 percent from its peak in 1989:1 to its trough 
in 1991:1.22 
Business  income is highly procyclical for at least two reasons.  First, 
sales and revenue fall, often very sharply, just before and during reces- 
sions.  Perry and Schultze  state that "weakness  in final sales  over the 
four quarters leading up to recession  comes  close  to being a feature of 
the  economy  that predicts  recessions."23  Second,  a large fraction  of 
firms' labor and capital costs  are fixed or quasi-fixed in the short run. 
With high fixed costs,  relatively small movements  in revenue can cause 
large proportionate changes  in internal finance,  particularly since cash 
flow is such a small fraction of sales for the typical firm.24 
In the modern corporation,  much of labor cost  is quasi-fixed in the 
short run. One reason is that hiring and training costs can be very large, 
especially  for  nonproduction  workers.25 According  to  the  Census  of 
Manufacturing, nonproduction  workers in 1981-82 accounted  for over 
34 percent of total workers and more than 45 percent of payroll costs. 
The "hoarding" of nonproduction  workers is evident  in manufacturing 
during recessions.  For example,  during the recession  in 1982, census 
figures indicate that the employment  of nonproduction  workers fell by 
only 0.4 percent.  As a result, total payroll (in 1982 dollars) fell by only 
2.5 percent, less than half the percentage decline in the real value of ship- 
21.  Mitchell (1951). 
22.  Qluar  ter/l' Financial  Repor-ts  are from the U.S.  Department of Commerce. 
23.  Perry and Schultze (1993, p. 148). 
24.  For Fortune 500 companies  in 1992, the median profit-to-sales ratio was 2.4 per- 
cent (Fortiune, April 19, 1993, p. 214). 
25.  For example,  see the review of the literature on hiring and training costs in Parsons 
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ments.26  The apparent fixity of nonproduction workers magnifies the ef- 
fect on internal finance brought on by any change in revenue. 
Why Is Inventory Investment  Particuilarly Sensitive 
to Internal-Finance  Shocks? 
Extreme  declines  in  internal finance  force  financially  constrained 
firms to curtail their accumulation of all assets.  However,  a firm in this 
situation should not cut investment proportionately across all assets.  In 
previous work, we point out that even financially constrained firms will 
seek to equate the marginal returns on different investments,  net of ad- 
justment  costs,  at each point in time. Therefore,  relatively liquid assets 
with low adjustment costs,  such as inventories,  should bear the brunt of 
temporary negative shocks to internal finance. Symmetrically,  improve- 
ments in internal finance during economic  recoveries  should induce the 
fastest accumulation of those same assets.  Several studies indicate that 
fixed investment  and research and development  (R&D), the other main 
components  of investment  expenditure,  have much greater adjustment 
costs  than inventories.27 
Unlike  largely  irreversible  investments  in R&D  and fixed  capital, 
firms can, and often do, dramatically cut their stocks  of inventory.  Re- 
ducing the proportion of internal finance devoted to inventory accumu- 
lation  releases  liquidity,  thus  relaxing  the  short-run  financing  con- 
straints  on  the  other  investment  activities  of  firms.  Most  inventory 
studies focus  on finished goods,  and although firms can build liquidity 
by operating with a smaller ratio of finished goods to sales,  raw-materi- 
als and work-in-process  inventories are much more volatile. Blinder and 
Maccini report that raw materials make up approximately 40 percent of 
26.  The U.S.  Department of Commerce's  Bureau of the Census conducts  this broad 
survey of U.S.  companies every five years. 
27.  Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Carpenter (1992). Zarnowitz (1992, p. 41) writes 
that inventories can be adjusted more quickly than fixed capital. Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) argue that R&D has high adjustment costs  and report evidence  that R&D is unre- 
sponsive  to temporary cash flow shocks.  Chirinko (1993) estimates  Euler equations  for 
firms with multiple capital inputs and finds that inventories have low and statistically insig- 
nificant adjustment costs,  while adjustment costs are significant and positive for R&D cap- 
ital, fixed capital, and labor. For further discussion,  see the review of research on adjust- 
ment costs  in Fazzari and Petersen (1993). 86  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
total manufacturing inventories  and are much more volatile than either 
work-in-process  or finished goods inventories.28 A firm can readily dis- 
invest a portion of its raw-materials stock by simply consuming it in pro- 
duction  and delaying  reordering.  The  firm temporarily operates  with 
lower-than-normal  stocks  of raw materials,  which releases  liquidity in 
the short run. Work-in-process inventories can be liquidated in a similar 
manner. 
There is, however,  a cost to reducing inventory  stocks.  Inventories 
can be viewed  like any other input to production.'9 As the levels  of in- 
ventory  stocks  fall, their marginal product rises  and it becomes  more 
costly  for firms to  sacrifice  inventories  at the  margin. The  extent  to 
which  inventory  investment  responds  to  internal-finance  fluctuations 
depends  on  the  initial stock  of  inventories.  Differences  in the  initial 
stocks may therefore help to explain variations in the behavior of inven- 
tory investment  across  business  cycles.  We develop  this point later in 
the paper by comparing inventory investment  shortfalls in the 1981-82 
and 1990-91 recessions. 
In sum,  inventories  constitute  a large and relatively  flexible part of 
firms' assets,  providing potential liquidity to offset shocks to internal fi- 
nance.  Therefore,  if financing constraints are important, we expect  ag- 
gregate inventory investment  to absorb a disproportionate  share of in- 
ternal-finance movements. 
Empirical  Specification 
To test the link between internal finance and inventory accumulation, 
we modify a widely  used inventory  investment  equation.  For firm j at 
time t (measured in quarters), we assume 
(1)  z~IV~  N.  (A[jy  -Nt)  -  ot (Sjt -  EtS,  ( 1  )  A\Njt  = A  (NtCJ  ?siCFt  t  ?  ) 
+Po  CFjt  + ,ICFJ,_t-  +  ^  it  - 2+  ejt,, 
where zAN1,  is inventory  investment  in period t, Njt and N,t denote  the 
actual and target stocks  of inventories  at the beginning of period t, Sjt 
and E,  Sfl represent the actual and forecasted  levels  of sales,  and CFjt 
represents cash flow, or the flow of internal finance. Blinder and Maccini 
28.  Blinder and Maccini (1991b, p. 295). 
29.  This point is emphasized by Ramey (1989). Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari, atnd  Bruce C. Peterseni  87 
describe the first two terms in equation 1 as "anticipated" and "unantici- 
pated" inventory investment.30 The stochastic  term e,  may include ag- 
gregate  and seasonal  effects  along  with  random errors,  as  discussed 
below. 
The stock adjustment term in equation 1 (N7t -  Nj,) relates the change 
of inventories to the gap between the target stock of inventories and the 
actual beginning-of-period  stock.  The speed of adjustment is given by 
the parameter X. The target stock is often related to expected  sales.  For 
finished goods  inventories,  this link comes  from a stockout-avoidance 
motive.3' As expected  sales rise, the probability of a costly  stockout in- 
creases,  inducing firms to hold more finished goods in inventory. To the 
extent  that expected  sales  vary with recent actual sales,  an inventory 
accelerator  is generated that may explain part of inventory investment 
volatility.  For work-in-process  and raw-materials inventories,  similar 
accelerator  effects  arise through the target stock  because  these  inven- 
tory components  can be modeled  as factors  of production.32 The  de- 
mand for these inputs varies with actual and expected  sales as well. 
We use a common model for target inventories: 
(2)  ?yj  +  ?yI  Et  Jt 
where xv;,  is a random error term. In addition to expected  sales, the target 
inventory level depends on a "fixed effect" (y)  that varies across firms. 
Blinder  develops  a  model  that  motivates  this  fixed-effect  term.  He 
writes  that desired  inventories  depend  on firm-specific  variables  that 
"would not be expected  to change very often or very quickly."33 Since 
some between-firm determinants of N* are likely to be correlated with 
sales and cash flow (for example,  long-run firm demand and technologi- 
cal conditions,  such as inventory storage costs),  failure to control for un- 
observable  fixed firm effects  will likely lead to inconsistent  parameter 
estimates  in equation  1. Indeed,  a Hausman test based on our regres- 
sions strongly rejects the independence  of firm effects from the other re- 
gressors. 
30.  Blinder and Maccini (199lb,  p. 303). Blanchard (1983) finds that an equation incor- 
porating the first two terms of equation  1 performs about as well in explaining automobile 
inventory investment as an explicit structural model derived from a quadratic technology. 
31.  See West (1986) and Kahn (1987). 
32.  See Ramey (1989). 
33.  Blinder (1982, p. 342). The second term in equation  1 arises from the role of inventories as a 
buffer stock  when  firms smooth  production.  If actual and forecasted 
sales  differ, inventory  investment  could reflect part of the difference, 
giving the sales forecast error a negative effect on inventory investment. 
Equation 3 is an autoregressive  forecast for sales similar to that used by 
Blinder:34 
(3)  E,_] Sit =  8j +  81  Sjt-I +  8  ?  Sit_^ +  v;, 
where 8j is a fixed firm effect and vjt  is a random expectation  error. This 
specification  may appear restrictive  since firms might anticipate  some 
part of actual sales in period t based on information other than that con- 
tained in lagged sales.  Because  of the buffer-stock  term in equation  1, 
however,  our  regression  equation  includes  contemporaneous  sales. 
Therefore,  the  model  controls  for any  correlation  between  expected 
sales and actual contemporaneous  sales not explained by lagged sales. 
This potential correlation affects our ability to identify the buffer-stock 
coefficient  ot but does  not affect the estimation  of the cash flow coeffi- 
cients. 
The cash flow terms in equation 1 are the main focus of our study. The 
approach here,  directly linking a firm's asset  accumulation  to its cash 
flow, is analogous to that taken by many authors in their tests of the im- 
pact of financing constraints on fixed capital investment.35 The timing of 
the cash flow effect is important. Previous fixed investment  studies use 
annual data and emphasize  contemporaneous  cash  flow.  Because  we 
use quarterly firm data, it is quite possible that financing constraints will 
be reflected in lags of cash flow. 
Estimating  Equlationi 
Substituting equations 2 and 3 into inventory investment  equation  1 
yields the regression equation: 
(4)  z\N=  -A  Nj,-of  S-  +  8 I(of  +  Xl1) Sit-  +  82 (of +  ?Y)  Sjt- 
+?  POCFjt  +? P CFjt -  +  13 CFjt  ?2  +  +  i  +uj, 
where Oj  is the linear combination of fixed firm effects and u,i  is the linear 
34.  Blinder (1986a). 
35.  See, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
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combination of stochastic  error terms from equations  1 throu'gh  3. The 
fixed firm effects  control for any time-invariant determinants of inven- 
tory investment across firms. The variable Oi,  represents time effects for 
industry i at time t. (We discuss  the importance of these  effects  in the 
next  subsection.)  In the  estimated  regressions,  all the  variables  are 
scaled by the firm's beginning-of-quarter total assets  (TAj,) to control for 
heteroscedasticity. 
The first four variables in equation 4 can be interpreted in the context 
of a production-smoothing model. In the results section,  we compare the 
coefficients  on these  variables with previous  findings in the inventory 
literature. For most of the purposes of our paper, however,  the first four 
variables can be thought of as controls,  allowing us to test the impor- 
tance of internal finance after controlling for the accelerator,  or sales, 
and stock-adjustment effects. 
A concern  sometimes  raised in the empirical literature on financing 
constraints is that positive  cash flow coefficients  may arise if cash flow 
variations contain new information about investment  opportunities not 
captured by variables that control  for investment  demand.  There are 
several responses  to this concern.  First, because  of the reversibility of 
inventories,  inventory investment  should respond to short-term expec- 
tations,  which  are likely  to be highly correlated  with current sales,  a 
variable included in all our regressions.  Second,  as emphasized in much 
of the literature, if cash flow only proxies for expectations,  one would 
expect  its  effects  to  be  similar for  both  small and large firms.  Con- 
versely,  a finding of different  cash flow effects across firm sizes strongly 
suggests  that cash flow is important as a source of finance.  Finally,  to 
test the robustness  of the specification  given in equation 4, we include 
changes  in stock  prices  and leads of sales,  two variables that directly 
measure expectations. 
Recognizing  the importance  of  sales  as a control for inventory  de- 
mand leads  to another concern  about the  specification  of equation  4: 
sales and cash flow may be highly collinear.  Our large microeconomic 
data set,  however,  is well  suited to identifying  these  separate effects 
since it contains considerable  firm-specific variation in cash flow that is 
independent from changes in sales.36 This fact is not surprising given the 
36.  A regression of the cash flow-asset  r  atio on contemporaneous  and two lagged val- 
ues of the sales-to-asset  ratio gives a highly significant coefficient  on sales,  but has an R2 
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wide variety of factors that prevent cash flow from moving proportion- 
ately  with  sales.  These  factors  include  short-run fixed  or quasi-fixed 
costs;  nonlinearities  in  firms'  technologies;  tax  effects;  interest  ex- 
penses;  and selling,  general,  and administrative  expenses.  Indeed,  as 
documented  above,  cash flow is much more volatile  than sales.  In our 
micro data, the coefficient  of variation for cash flow is nearly five times 
larger, on average, than that for sales, as is documented below. 
Time and Seasonal  Effects 
The use of firm-level panel data makes it possible to include fixed time 
effects; an innovation here is to define these effects at a highly disaggre- 
gated industry level. This approach provides a general way to control for 
alternative explanations  of inventory volatility.  For example,  including 
time dummies for each industry is an effective  method of controlling for 
cost shocks.  Several recent papers emphasize that favorable temporary 
cost  shocks  might cause  optimizing firms to "bunch" production  into 
low-cost  periods,  causing  high  inventory  investment.37  Also,  other 
things equal, when costs  are low,  cash flow will be high. Therefore,  in 
the absence of a control for cost shocks,  such shocks might induce a spu- 
rious correlation between cash flow and inventory investment. 
We include time dummies disaggregated to the four-digit SIC indus- 
try level (denoted by Oi,  for industry i at time t). These dummies control 
for  any  industry-level  technological  shocks  as  well  as  industrywide 
movements  in the costs  of labor,  raw materials,  and capital.  (Studies 
based on aggregate or industry data, which dominate the inventory in- 
vestment  literature,  do  not  have  the cross-sectional  heterogeneity  to 
control for these effects.)  In regressions that include time dummies, the 
cash flow results cannot be attributed to any time-varying effects  disag- 
gregated to the four-digit SIC level.38 The disadvantage of including time 
37.  Evidence on the importance of cost shocks is mixed. Eichenbaum (1989) finds that 
his "production-cost  smoothing"  model  cannot  be rejected  while the "production-level 
smoothing" model is rejected.  Maccini and Rossana (1984) as well as Blinder (1986a) find 
some effect of raw-materials costs  on finished goods  inventory investment,  but virtually 
no  effects  of  interest  rates or wages.  Nerlove,  Ross,  and Wilson  (1993) find that cost 
shocks are "rarely significant" in survey data. Miron and Zeldes (1988) also find little evi- 
dence for the importance of cost shocks. 
38.  The only remaining shocks that cannot be controlled for are those that are idiosyn- 
cratic to individual firms. Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. FazZari, and Brluce C. Petersen  91 
dummies,  however,  is that they remove  the common cyclical  variance 
of inventory investment and cash flow for each industry. Therefore, we 
also estimate equations with four-digit quarter dummies rather than with 
the full set of time dummies.  In addition, we add explicit cost variables 
to some of the regressions;  they include interest rates, wage costs,  and 
energy costs.39 
Finally, inventory investment  has a strong seasonal component.  Our 
four-digit time dummies control for seasonality at the industry level. Ner- 
love, Ross, and Wilson argue that time dummies are the best way to con- 
trol for seasonality  in inventory  studies.40 In fact,  in regressions  with 
quarter dummies (but not year-quarter dummies), we have sufficient de- 
grees  of freedom  to include  dummies  for every  firm. This procedure 
gives very similar results to that using four-digit quarter dummies. 
Data  Description  and Summary  Statistics 
We construct our sample from the Compustat quarterly data tapes for 
the  period  1981-92.  The  quarterly tapes  contain  data on the  income 
statements and balance sheets of several thousand publicly traded com- 
panies.  To  date,  Compustat's  quarterly data have  been  virtually un- 
tapped by researchers examining the financial and investment  behavior 
of firms.4' 
We choose  a set of easily  reproducible rules for the construction  of 
our three panels. All firms in our sample are domestically  incorporated. 
We require that each panel be balanced and exclude  the extreme lower 
tail of the size distribution because many of these firms are startup oper- 
ations,  often with zero inventories  and negative  cash flows.42 We also 
exclude  all mergers identified by Compustat because  they could gener- 
39.  A similar approach is used by Maccini and Rossana (1984) and Blinder (1986a). 
40.  See  Nerlove,  Ross,  and  Wilson  (1993).  Beaulieu,  MacKie-Mason,  and  Miron 
(1992) report significant differences  in the seasonal cycles  of two-digit SIC manufacturing 
industries. 
41.  Our data include quarterly information for every active firm covered by the annual 
Compustat data. Data are available quarterly for total inventories but not for the separate 
components:  finished goods,  raw materials, and work-in-process. 
42.  We exclude  firms with less than $10 million in assets.  Firms below this cutoff ac- 
count for only a small fraction of inventory  investment.  Changing the cutoff value to $5 
million had little effect on the results.  Even though a firm is excluded  from one period, it 
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ate discontinuities  in the stocks of inventory.  To protect against results 
driven by a small number of extreme observations,  we exclude observa- 
tions in the  1 percent tails for each regression variable.43 Our resulting 
sample covers a substantial portion of aggregate manufacturing invento- 
ries (54.5 percent over the full sample period). Since manufacturing ac- 
counts for over half of aggregate inventories,  our sample has clear rele- 
vance for explaining macroeconomic  inventory behavior. 
The sample period contains three distinct inventory cycles,  including 
the  1981-82 and the  1990-91  recessions.  We  split the data into three 
panels:  1981:1-1983:4,  1984:1-1988:3,  and  1988:4-1992:4,  where  the 
splits are determined by the peaks in aggregate inventory  investment. 
There are several advantages  to analyzing  several  short panels as op- 
posed to one long panel. First, we lose comparatively few firms from bal- 
ancing  each  panel,  an  important  consideration  since  Compustat  ex- 
panded its coverage  during the 1980s. Second,  short panels reduce the 
likelihood  of  introducing  trends  that  might dominate  cyclical  move- 
ments in the data. Third, we can examine  the heterogeneity  of our re- 
sults across  different time periods,  which is valuable because  of differ- 
ences in prevailing financial market conditions.  Finally, a comparison of 
parameter estimates  across  panels provides a test of the robustness  of 
our findings. 
If firms do not have equal access  to external financial markets,  the 
sensitivity  of investment  (of all types)  to internal-finance fluctuations 
will differ across firms. As discussed  in our review of the financing-con- 
straint literature, researchers have divided samples according to reten- 
tion ratios, bond ratings, and firm size.  For most of our regressions,  we 
split the data according to firm size as a proxy for access  to external fi- 
nance. As an alternative test for heterogeneity,  we also compare results 
for firms with bond ratings with those for firms without bond ratings.44 
We place firms with less than $300 million in average total assets  (in 
1987 dollars) into the small firm-size class.  Similar cutoffs  have  been 
used elsewhere  to distinguish small from large firms.45  This cutoff also 
gives  an approximately  equal number of firms in each class  during the 
43.  We ran all the main regressions  (presented  in tables 4 and 5 below)  with several 
different outlier cutoffs r  anging from 0.5 to 2.0 percent. The results were not significantly 
affected  by using these different cutoffs. 
44.  See Whited (1992) and Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994). 
45.  See Scherer and Ross (1990, table 3.1) and Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). Robert  E.  Carpenter,  Steven  M.  Fazzari,  and Bruce  C. Petersen  93 
Table 1.  Medians of Selected Firm Characteristics,  1981-92 
Units as indicated 
1981:1-1984.:1  1984:2-1988:3  1988:4-1992:4 
Smnall  Lar-ge  Smlatll  Lar-ge  Smlatll  Lar  ge 
ChlarIacter-istic  firm171s  firlns  firmns  firmns  firmns  firmns 
Number of firms  241  247  441  230  594  280 
Employment  (thousands)  1.5  17.0  0.9  12.8  0.7  10.0 
Total assets  (millions 
of  1987 dollars)  97.6  1,485.6  63.8  1,386.8  62.5  1,251.4 
Inventories  (millions 
of  1987 dollars)  23.3  271.0  14.9  215.5  14.2  198.8 
Sales  (millions of  1987 
dollars)  35.8  485.1  20.1  386.9  19.3  337.8 
Sales  growth (annualized 
percent)  -  0.8  -  2.8  5.7  4.9  3.2  1.6 
Ratios 
Cash flow to net 
sources  of finance  0.863  0.927  0.875  0.881  0.926  0.857 
Stock  issues  to net 
sources  of financea  0.002  0.010  0.004  0.010  0.002  0.005 
Debt  issues  to net 
sources  of financea  0.022  0.015  0.047  0.071  0.000  0.067 
Retentionb  0.793  0.618  0.982  0.677  1.000  0.705 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Compustat data. 
a.  Total net sources  of finance are the sum of cash flow, funds raised from the net sale of common  and preferred 
stock,  and the change  in total debt. 
b.  Ratio of net income  less  total dividends  to net income. 
first period. For comparability,  we use the same cutoff in the other two 
periods.  We experimented  with several other cutoffs  around $300 mil- 
lion with little effect on the results. Small firms account for a significant 
fraction of manufacturing. Gertler and Gilchrist report QFR statistics 
showing that over 32 percent of manufacturing sales is accounted for by 
firms with less than $300 million in assets.46 
Table  1 reports  size  statistics  and  sources  of  finance  for all three 
panels.  The pronounced  differences  between  small and large firms are 
readily apparent. The median large firm is more than ten times  larger 
than the median small firm in our panels.  Median total assets  for small 
firms in the first period are $98 million versus $1.5 billion for large firms. 
Small firms employ a median of 1,500 employees  and have median sales 
of $36 million.  By contrast,  median employment  for large firms is ap- 
proximately  17,000 and large firms have median sales  of $485 million. 
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The differences between firms in the two size classes  become more pro- 
nounced in the second and third periods with the expansion  of Compu- 
stat's coverage  of small firms. The summary statistics also indicate that 
inventories  constitute  a considerable  fraction  (16-24  percent)  of total 
assets  in both size categories and in all three time periods. 
The  second  half of table  1 reports statistics  on sources  of finance. 
Small firms pay very few, if any, dividends.  The median retention ratio, 
which we define as the ratio of income less dividends to income, is 0.79, 
0.98,  and  1.00 for small firms in each  period,  respectively,  compared 
with 0.62, 0.68, and 0.71 for large firms. The higher retention ratios for 
small firms are consistent  with the view that small firms are more likely 
to  face  binding  financing  constraints.  Dividing  our  sample  by  size 
roughly approximates  a sample  split based  on positive  dividend  pay- 
ments.  We define total net sources  of finance as the sum of cash flow, 
funds raised from the net sale of common  and preferred stock,  and the 
change  in total debt.  The largest source  of finance for both groups of 
firms is cash flow. The median cash flow-to-net  sources ratio is 0.85 or 
greater for both size categories  and for all periods. The least important 
source of finance in our sample is new equity. The median value of new 
shares to total sources for all firms amounts to less than 1 percent of their 
funds.  (Note  that the median ratios will not sum to unity.) The propor- 
tion of funds raised through new debt is also  relatively  small for both 
groups of firms. Overall, the numbers in the table suggest that the me- 
dian firm makes modest use of external finance compared with internal 
finance. 
Comovements  of Inventories  and Cash Flow 
Figures  1 and 2 show the seasonally  adjusted plots of the quarterly 
means for inventory investment  and cash flow for both small and large 
firms. Both  variables  are scaled  by beginning-of-quarter total assets. 
The left-hand scale refers to inventory investment; the right-hand scale 
refers to cash flow. Vertical lines represent the period boundaries.  (As 
can be seen from figure Al  in the appendix,  our inventory  investment 
series based on firm data are highly correlated with aggregate manufac- 
turing inventory investment.) 
Figures 1 and 2 reveal important features of the time-series character- 
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Figure 1.  Inventory Investment and Cash Flow Ratios for Small Firmsa 
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a.  Inventory investment  and cash flow are divided by beginning-of-period total assets.  Data are seasonally  adjusted 
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Figure 2.  Inventory Investment and Cash Flow Ratios for Large Firmsa 
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and large firms move together quite closely;  the correlation between the 
two investment series is 0.73. Second, the inventory investment of small 
firms appears to be more volatile  over the business  cycle  than that of 
large firms. Finally, and most important, for both plots, there is a close 
correspondence  between inventory investment and cash flow; the corre- 
lations are 0.75 for small firms and 0.56 for large firms. 
Figures 1 and 2 also highlight several interesting macro episodes  dur- 
ing the  sample  period.  In the  recovery  from the  1982 recession,  the 
trough-to-peak increase in inventory  investment  is one-third larger for 
small firms, even though their cash flow increased  by less than that of 
large firms. We might expect this pattern if small firms increased inven- 
tory investment not only to meet higher sales but also to replenish stocks 
drawn down to release  internal finance during the previous  recession. 
For both small and large firms, there is a sharp decline in cash flow and 
inventory investment  during 1985, which also occurs in U.S.  aggregate 
data. Once again, the movement  in inventory investment  is greater for 
small firms than for large firms. Finally,  in the last period,  cash  flow 
peaks in late 1988 and then declines  sharply. In contrast to the first two 
periods,  the fall in inventory investment  for large firms is modest com- 
pared with the decline in cash flow, a fact that is reflected in the regres- 
sion results reported in the next section. 
Also  note that the means of inventory investment  are often negative 
for both small and large firms. For large firms, there are quarters of in- 
ventory disinvestment  at the troughs of each cyclical period in the data. 
Inventory disinvestment  was prolonged and deep during the 1981-82 re- 
cession,  especially  in comparison with the 1990-91 recession. 
Summary Statistics for  the Regr-ession Var-iables 
Tables 2 and 3 report means and within-firm standard deviations  for 
the key variables used in our regressions,  by firm size and period. The 
construction of all variables, including the adjustment to inventories for 
LIFO (last in, first out) and FIFO (first in, first out) accounting,  is de- 
scribed in the data appendix. All variables are flows, with the exception 
of the stock of inventories,  and they are all scaled by beginning-of-quar- 
ter total assets.  The mean inventory investment ratio reported in table 2 
is substantially greater for small firms than for large firms in periods  1 
and 2, which is consistent  with the fact that small firms' sales are grow- Robert  E.  Carpenter,  Steven  M.  Fazzari,  and  Brulce C. Peter-sen  97 
Table 2.  Sample Means of Regression Variables 
1981:1-1984:1  1984:2-1988:3  1988:4-1991  .4 
Smnball  Large  Smi  all  La  rge  Smiiall  La  rge 
Var-iablea  firmis  firmns  firms  7  firmls  firmI71s  finnI71s 
Inventory  investment 
(A  N,/TA,)  0.0020  -0.0009  0.0051  0.0026  0.0017  0.0018 
Stock  of inventories 
(N, /TA,)  0.2860  0.2095  0.2653  0.1919  0.2513  0.1805 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.0221  0.0262  0.0226  0.0286  0.0207  0.0243 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  0.4172  0.3602  0.3526  0.3235  0.3198  0.2887 
Souice:  Auithors' calctilations  from Compustat data. 
a.  Each variable has been divided  by the firm's beginning-of-qUalrter  total assets. 
ing faster. The cash flow ratio is somewhat  greater for large firms than 
for small firms. Note that since cash flow is quarterly and we scale it by 
total assets,  the ratios are smaller than those reported in studies of fixed 
investment with annual data scaled by the fixed capital stock. 
Two further observations  from table 2 are relevant to the linkage be- 
tween  internal  finance  and  inventory  investment.  First,  inventory 
stocks  are, on average,  27 percent of total assets  for small firrns and 19 
percent of total assets for large firms. Over all firms, inventories average 
nearly ten times quarterly cash flows, which means that firms can offset 
large negative  cash flow shocks  with relatively  small reductions  in in- 
ventory stocks.  For example,  for the typical firm, a single quarterly de- 
cline of 50 percent in cash flow could be offset by a 5 percent reduction 
in the stock  of inventories.  Second,  across  the three time periods,  the 
ratio of the stock of inventories to total assets has declined for both small 
Table 3.  Within-Firm Standard Deviatioiis of Regression Variables 
1981.:1-1984:  1  1984.:2-1988:3  1988:4-1991.4 
Smiiall  Large  Smi7(all  LarEge  Smiiall  La  rge 
Variable  firms  firms7ls  firm,7ls  firmiiis  firmiiis  ,firms 
Inventory  investment 
(AN,/TA,)  0.0227  0.0148  0.0253  0.0172  0.0252  0.0168 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.0121  0.0103  0.0165  0.0140  0.0193  0.0158 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  0.0481  0.0356  0.0507  0.0421  0.0448  0.0366 
Source:  Authois'  calcUlations from CompUstat data. 
a.  Each variable has been divided  by the firm's beginning-of-quarter total assets. 98  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
and large firms.47 Under  our hypothesis,  the  role of  inventories  as a 
source of liquidity, and therefore as a potential shock absorber, has di- 
minished. 
Table 3 presents the within-firm standard deviations  of inventory in- 
vestment,  cash  flow,  and sales.  Inventory  investment  is substantially 
more volatile for small firms; the standard deviation is about 50 percent 
larger.48  Cash flow is also more volatile for small firms, but the difference 
between  large and small firms is not nearly as great as that for inventory 
investment.  The ratio of the standard deviation of inventory investment 
to the standard deviation of cash flow (averaged over the three periods) 
is  1.57 for small firms and 1.24 for large firms. The fact that for small 
firms inventory investment is more volatile, relative to cash flow, is con- 
sistent  with the financing-constraint hypothesis:  for any given fluctua- 
tion in internal finance,  small firms should exhibit a greater inventory 
response. 
Regression Results 
This  section  presents  results  from  estimating  several  versions  of 
equation 4. We also discuss  results from instrumental variables estima- 
tion, specifications  that account for short-term debt and cash stocks as 
possible  sources  of inventory finance, and results obtained by splitting 
the data according to firms' bond ratings. 
Pr-imary  Specification 
Tables 4 and 5 report the main regression results for the specification 
given by equation 4. All regressions include fixed firm effects that elimi- 
nate the influence of differences  in the average levels  of the regressors 
across firms; in other words, all remaining variation is in the time dimen- 
sion of the data. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
by White's method, and the degrees of freedom are adjusted to account 
for the implicit firm and time dummies in the regressions.  Each table 
47.  This decline is consistent  with  'just-in-time" inventory management practices.  It 
is mirrored in the QFR aggregate data for manufacturing firms. Similar trends are docu- 
mented by Morgan (1991) and Kopcke (1993). 
48.  This finding is consistent  with those emphasized by Geitlei  and Gilchrist (1994). Robert  E.  Carpenter,  Steven  M.  Fazzari,  and  Bruce  C. Petersen  99 
Table 4.  Regressions of Inventory Investment with Quarter Dummiesa 
Smiiall  finnwls  Large  firnns 
Samiiple  period  Standlar-d  Stanidar-d 
anid  inidepenidenit  variableb  Coefficienit  error  Coefficienit  error 
Periodl 1, 1981.3-1984:1 
Lagged inventory  (N,  I/TA,)  - 0.235  0.025  -0.236  0.032 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -  0.054  0.015  0.004  0.017 
(S,  I/TA1 l)  0.046  0.016  0.029  0.017 
(St  2/TA  ,2)  0.035  0.015  0.037  0.015 
Cash flow (CF,ITA,)  0.173  0.058  0.129  0.044 
(CF,/TA,  1)  0.154  0.061  0.131  0.041 
(CF<,  /TA_-2)  0.101  0.062  -0.033  0.041 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.428  0.080  0.227  0.061 
Adjusted  R2  0.434  ...  0.335  ... 
Period 2,  1984:2-1988.3 
Lagged inventory  (N,  I/TA,)  -  0.154  0.011  -0.134  0.017 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -  0.061  0.011  0.013  0.014 
(S,  l/TA, 1)  0.078  0.010  0.056  0.013 
(St  ,/TA,  2)  0.033  0.009  -0.013  0.011 
Cash flow (CFITA,)  0.166  0.024  0.068  0.028 
(CF  /  IITA  ,- 1)  0.031  0.022  0.079  0.025 
(CF, 2/TA,  2)  0.068  0.023  0.058  0.020 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.265  0.033  0.205  0.038 
Adjusted  R2  0.345  ..  .  0.346 
Period 3,  1988:4-1992:4 
Lagged inventory  (N,  I/TA,)  -  0.187  0.011  -0.208  0.020 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.070  0.010  0.016  0.015 
(S/  IITA,1)  0.087  0.010  0.058  0.015 
(St  ,/TA,,2)  0.041  0.009  0.038  0.014 
Cash flow (CFITA,)  0.151  0.019  0.016  0.019 
(CF,  IITA, 1)  0.028  0.018  0.004  0.017 
(CF,2  ITA,  2)  0.020  0.018  -0.006  0.018 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.199  0.027  0.014  0.029 
Adjusted  R2  0.256  ...  0.354 
Source:  Authors'  regressions  using Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is inventory  investment  (N,ITA,).  All equations  are estimated  with fixed firm effects. 
Quarter dummies are included for each four-digit SIC industry, as described in the text.  Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity  using White's  method.  Standard errors are also  corrected  for degrees  of freedom  lost duLe  to 
the dummy variables.  The adjusted R2 statistics  exclude  variance explained  by the fixed firm effects. 
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Table 5.  Regressions of Inventory Investment with Time Dummiesa 
Smlall firmins  Lar-ge  firms 
Sample  per-iod  Standar-d  Standar-d 
an  )d  inidepenidenit  variableb  Coefficienit  error  Coefficient  error 
Period  1, 1981:3-1984:1 
Lagged inventory  (N,t1/TA,)  -  0.271  0.047  -0.304  0.064 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.085  0.025  -0.035  0.029 
(S,t1/TA,tl)  0.027  0.025  0.017  0.023 
(S,  2/TA,  2)  0.065  0.025  0.060  0.019 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.087  0.093  0.104  0.067 
(CF,/ ITA,  1)  0.092  0.094  0.098  0.058 
(CF,  2/TA,  2)  0.077  0.096  -0.108  0.058 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.256  0.152  0.094  0.088 
Adjusted  R2  0.227  .  .  .  0.2i6  .  .  . 
Per-iod 2,  1984:2-1988:3 
Lagged inventory  (N,  I  /TA,)  - 0.161  0.015  -0.134  0.023 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.075  0.014  -0.015  0.019 
(S,t  /TA,t  )  0.075  0.013  0.046  0.018 
(S,  2/TA,  2)  0.037  0.013  0.024  0.015 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.155  0.034  0.084  0.041 
(CF,/ ITA,  1)  0.029  0.031  0.072  0.035 
(CF,  2/TA,  2)  0.048  0.032  0.033  0.029 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.232  0.049  0.189  0.057 
Adjusted  R2  0.278  ...  0.300 
Period 3,  1988.4-1992:4 
Lagged inventory  (N,t1/TA,)  - 0.196  0.013  -0.295  0.031 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.083  0.012  0.020  0.023 
(S,t  /TA,  1)  0.081  0.011  0.060  0.021 
(S,t  /TA,,2)  0.046  0.010  0.052  0.021 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.155  0.024  -0.015  0.028 
(CF,  I/TA, 1)  0.020  0.022  -0.018  0.025 
(CF, 2/TA,  2)  0.010  0.022  -0.021  0.026 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.185  0.034  -0.054  0.043 
Adjusted  R2  0.244  ...  0.339  ... 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is  inventory  investment  (N,/TA,).  All equations  are estimated  with fixed firm effects. 
Time dummies  are included for each four-digit SIC industry, as described  in the text.  Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity  using White's  method.  Standard errors are also  corrected  for degrees  of freedom  lost  due to 
the dummy variables.  The adjusted R' statistics  exclude  variance explained  by the fixed firm effects. 
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contains  results for the three time periods,  as well as separate regres- 
sions  for small and large firms. The regressions  in table 4 differ from 
those  in table 5 only in their treatment of fixed time effects.  In table 4, 
the regressions include quarter dummies for each four-digit SIC industry 
to control for seasonality.  In table 5, the regressions include a more gen- 
eral set of four-digit SIC dummies each defined for each time period in 
the data (that is, a separate dummy for each possible  year-quarter com- 
bination in each four-digit industry).  As  discussed  earlier, these  time 
dummies control for all time-varying effects  at the industry level  or at 
higher levels of aggregation. But they also remove the common cyclical 
component of inventory investment,  cash flow, and sales for each four- 
digit industry. Therefore, the results in table 5 may be interpreted as an 
extreme test of our hypothesis  when idiosyncratic firm variation alone, 
independent of cyclical industry movements,  is used to estimate the co- 
efficients. 
In tables 4 and 5, the coefficients  on lagged inventory  stock variable 
are always negative and highly significant. The estimated  speeds of ad- 
justment from the actual to the desired inventory stock, ranging from 13 
to 30 percent a quarter, are consistent  with other estimates  in the litera- 
ture.49  Omitting the fixed firm effects has a large influence on the results 
(not shown), reducing the adjustment speed dramatically. (The point es- 
timates range from 1.5 to 4.2 percent a quarter.) This outcome  demon- 
strates the importance  of controlling  for fixed firm effects.  For small 
firms, we obtain negative and significant contemporaneous  sales effects 
in all regressions in tables 4 and 5, which suggest the presence of buffer- 
stock  effects.  For  large firms,  the  evidence  is  mixed,  with  negative 
buffer-stock  coefficients  only  in table 5 and only for periods  1 and 2. 
When cash flow is excluded from the regression (not shown), these coef- 
ficients increase,  on average, by about 50 percent. Thus, it is likely that 
excluding cash flow may be partially responsible for the fact that studies 
in the inventory literature often fail to find any negative effects of unan- 
49.  We estimate speeds of adjustment comparable with other studies despite two dis- 
advantages of our data for this purpose. First, although time aggregation can lower adjust- 
ment speeds,  we obtain estimates with quarterly firm data that are broadly consistent  with 
those obtained from monthly industry data. Second,  as Blinder (1986a) finds, combining 
finished goods, work-in-process,  and raw-materials inventories is likely to lower estimated 
adjustment speeds.  But our results for total inventories are not much different from those 
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ticipated sales movements  on inventory investment.50 All but one of the 
lagged sales coefficients  are positive,  consistent  with a positive acceler- 
ator effect for inventories. 
The main focus  of our study is the cash flow effect.  Consistent  with 
the  financing-constraint  hypothesis,  the  sum of  the  cash  flow  coeffi- 
cients,  and many of the individual coefficients,  are positive  and signifi- 
cant in all of the regressions presented in tables 4 and 5, except for large 
firms in period 351  The only major difference in the cash flow results be- 
tween  tables 4 and 5 occurs  in period  1, which we discuss  below.  For 
small firms, the sums of the cash flow coefficients  are economically  im- 
portant in all three periods (sums ranging from 0.185 to 0.428). The cash 
flow sums for large firms are also positive  in the first two periods. Thus, 
a substantial fraction of the quarter-to-quarter variation in cash flow is 
reflected  in inventory  changes,  even  though  inventory  accumulation 
constitutes  a very small net use of funds over the long horizon (see table 
2). This finding is consistent  with our argument that inventory  adjust- 
ment is a relatively low-cost  way for financially constrained firms to re- 
spond to temporary cash flow shocks .52 
The differences in the cash flow effects between large and small firms 
support the view that inventory investment is affected by financing con- 
straints. As discussed  previously,  small firms are likely to face tighter 
financing constraints,  and we  therefore  expect  that the effect  of cash 
flow shocks  on inventory investment  should be greater for small firms. 
This  result  occurs  for the  sum of  the  cash  flow  coefficients  in all of 
our regressions,  and the difference is statistically significant in periods 1 
and 3. 
As discussed  previously,  the different cash flow effects  across those 
categories of firms that are presumed to have different access to financial 
50.  See, for example,  Blinder (1986a). 
51.  When an additional lag of cash flow was included in the regressions,  it was insig- 
nificant and had virtually no effect on the cash flow sums. The standard er  r  ors for the cash 
flow sums are large in table 5 (period 1) because  of the degrees  of fieedom  lost from the 
large number of time dummies relative to the sample size.  Nevertheless  a X2  test based on 
the asymptotically efficient covariance matrix rejects the null hypothesis that the cash flow 
sums are zero in these regressions at a 1 percent significance level for small firms and a 6 
percent level for large firms. 
52.  The magnitude of the coefficients  is similar to estimates of the impact of cash flow 
on fixed investment (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen,  1988, for example) even though av- 
erage inventory investment  is much smaller than fixed investment.  Therefore,  inventory 
investment  appears to be disproportionately  sensitive  to cash flow, compared with fixed 
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markets are important evidence  that cash flow does not simply proxy for 
expectations  about future investment opportunities. To further examine 
the question of expectations,  we added to equation 4 two different sets 
of variables-stock  price growth and leads of sales-that  explicitly  re- 
late to expectations.  The results (not shown) have two interesting fea- 
tures. First, the coefficients  on these variables are consistent  with their 
role as measures of expectations.  The stock-price variables (contempo- 
ranepus and two lagged values) have positive and significant coefficients 
in 8 of the 12 regressions corresponding to tables 4 and 5. The one-quar- 
ter lead of  sales  is important in all of the regressions  with t-statistics 
ranging from four to more than ten; a two-quarter lead had little effect. 
Second,  and most important, including these expectational  proxies has 
virtually no effect on the cash flow results.53 These  results lend further 
support to our interpretation of the cash flow effects  as indicators of fi- 
nancing constraints on inventory investment. 
Our finding of  economically  important cash  flow  effects  for  large 
firms in periods 1 and 2, and the robustness of this finding when a variety 
of additional expectational  proxies were included in the regression,  sug- 
gests  a role for financing constraints  in the inventory behavior of even 
large firms, helping to establish the importance of financing constraints 
for the aggregate cyclical  behavior of inventory investment.  To further 
explore the cash flow effect for large firms, we increased the cutoff size 
for large firms from $300 million in assets  to $1 billion. The cash flow 
sums for this subsample (not shown) are somewhat lower than those re- 
ported in both tables 4 and 5 for large firms, but the effect remains sig- 
nificant in periods  1 and 2.  Increasing the cutoff beyond $1 billion did 
not reduce the cash flow sums further, indicating that some positive  fi- 
nancing effect remains even for very large firms. These results are con- 
sistent with the fact that most large firms do not have access  to publicly 
53.  In regressions  with quarter dummies (as in table 4), the cash flow sums for small 
firms with leads of sales in the regressions  are 0.379, 0.298, and 0.218 for periods 1-3. The 
corresponding sums for large firms are 0.266,  0.222,  and 0.015.  With stock price growth 
variables in the regressions,  the small-firm cash flow sums are 0.331, 0.266, and 0.183 and 
the large-firm sums are 0.220, 0.212, and 0.016. Further details and results corresponding 
to table 5 are available from the authors. 
54.  The cash flow sums for regressions  that correspond  to those  in table 4 are 0.186, 
0.152, and -  0.006 for periods 1, 2, and 3 respectively,  and the difference of the sums be- 
tween small firms and those with more than $1 billion in assets is statistically significant in 
all three periods. Averaged across the three periods, these coefficients  declined by 26 per- 
cent compared with the large-firm sample analyzed in table 4. The sums corresponding to 
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traded short-term debt (commercial-paper  programs) and many do not 
have bond ratings. 
The relative magnitudes of the cash flow coefficients  over the three 
time periods are also of interest and lend support to the financing-con- 
straint hypothesis.55 In the first panel of table 4, which covers the 1981- 
82 recession,  the cash flow coefficients  are large for both size classes. 
These  results are consistent  with the pronounced  decline  in aggregate 
inventory  investment  during the  1981-82  recession.  Such  a  decline 
could probably occur only if large firms made major cuts in inventory 
investment.  This was also a period of very tight money,  when credit ra- 
tioning could have been severe even for large firms. 
The second period includes the economic  slowdown  in 1985-86. Ag- 
gregate  cash  flow and inventory  investment  in these  two  years  were 
lower than in the immediately preceding and following  years, although 
the reductions  were  not as dramatic as those  in the earlier recession. 
Nevertheless,  the aggregate decline in manufacturing inventory invest- 
ment  as  a percentage  of  the  decline  in manufacturing cash  flow was 
larger during this slowdown  than during the early 1980s. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find significant cash flow effects for this period. 
In the third period, the cash flow coefficients  for large firms are small 
in tables 4 and 5. Again, this result is consistent  with the historical re- 
cord. Aggregate reductions in inventory investment  during the 1990-91 
recession,  compared  with  those  during the  1981-82  recession,  were 
smaller and more spread out, although cash flow declined dramatically. 
In addition, aggregate inventory stocks were lower entering the 1990-91 
recession,  which might reduce the extent to which optimizing firms cut 
inventories to respond to reductions in cash flow. We discuss these mac- 
roeconomic  issues in more depth in the next section. 
Our results are largely the same whether one looks at regressions that 
include only quarter dummies (table 4) or regressions that include a full 
set of time dummies (table 5). For periods 2 and 3, the coefficients  in ta- 
55.  Because our sample varies across periods, we checked the pattern of the cash flow 
effects  across time by examining a sample of firms balanced across the full period (1981:3 
to  1992:4). In this sample,  the cash flow sums have the same pattern across  time as re- 
ported in tables 4 and 5 for both small and large firms. The differences in the sums between 
the small and large firms are approximately the same.  Finally, when we pooled the three 
time periods for this balanced sample,  the cash flow coefficients  fall between  the coeffi- 
cients estimated for the three periods separately: 0.240 for small firms and 0. 140 for large 
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bles 4 and 5 are very similar. For period 1, the cash flow sums are smaller 
in table 5 than they are in table 4. The standard errors, corrected for the 
lost degrees  of freedom,  are larger in table 5 than in table 4 because  of 
the much larger set of time dummies. The decline in the cash flow coef- 
ficients is not surprising because  the additional time dummies remove 
all the cyclical variation in cash flow common to firms in each four-digit 
industry.  Because  period  1 contains  the sharp cyclical  episode  of the 
early 1980s, it is likely that common cash flow variation at the four-digit 
level  dominates  idiosyncratic  cash flow variation for this period.  With 
less variation to identify the cash flow effect,  measurement errors may 
become more severe,  pushing the cash flow coefficients  downward. The 
important point is that the cash flow effects remain strong, especially for 
small firms, even in the rather extreme experiment that attributes all of 
the time-series  variation at the industry level to factors other than cash 
flow. 
To explore whether the differences between  the size of the cash flow 
effects in period 1 are due to cost shocks,  we ran some additional regres- 
sions. We included the first differences of explicit cost measures-inter- 
est  rates,  wages,  and energy  costs-in  regressions  with dummy vari- 
ables as defined in table 4.56  The most interesting effects  were obtained 
for the energy cost variable in period 1. It has a negative and significant 
coefficient in the small-firm regression. (Its coefficient is insignificant for 
large firms.) The coefficients  on the interest rate are usually positive but 
insignificant. Including these three cost variables in the regression low- 
ers the cash flow sum for small firms to 0.382 from 0.428. The change for 
large firms is negligible,  with the  sum falling from 0.227 to 0.224.  In- 
cluding the explicit cost variables has no effect on the cash flow results 
in any of the regressions for period 2 or 3. Thus, it does not appear that 
cost  shocks  account for much of the difference between  the cash flow 
coefficients  reported in tables 4 and 5 for period 1. 
Instrumental  Variables Results 
In the literature on cash flow and fixed investment,  researchers have 
been concerned  about the endogeneity  of contemporaneous  cash flow. 
56.  The wage and energy data were disaggregated to the two-digit SIC level. The inter- 
est rate was the three-month Treasury bill rate less actual inflation measured by the GDP 
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This concern is mitigated in our context for several reasons.  First, with 
high-frequency  data it is less  likely that the returns generated by con- 
temporaneous  investment  will affect contemporaneous  cash flow. Sec- 
ond,  the  most  likely  source  for a correlation  between  cash  flow  and 
shocks  to inventory investment  is unanticipated sales  movements,  for 
which we control.  Third, although technological  or cost  shocks  might 
generate  a correlation between  cash flow and shocks  to inventory  in- 
vestment,  we can control for industry-level  cost shocks with time dum- 
mies.  Moreover,  the  evidence  presented  above  suggests  that  cost 
shocks are not particularly important for our cash flow results. 
To check  the robustness  of the inventory-cash  flow link, however, 
we  also  ran the regressions  with an instrumental variables procedure 
that has been used in the financing-constraint literature.57  For this pur- 
pose,  only contemporaneous  cash flow enters the model, permitting the 
use of cash flow lags as instruments.58 Results from this procedure are 
presented in table 6. Because of the quarterly frequency of the data, sea- 
sonality must be treated carefully when using lagged cash flow as an in- 
strument for contemporaneous  cash flow.  Therefore,  the instrumental 
variable regressions  are estimated with quarter dummies defined at the 
firm level.59 
In table 6, the coefficients  on lagged inventory  stock  and sales  are 
similar to those  obtained from the ordinary least  squares regressions. 
One exception  is that the coefficient  on the second  lag of sales is near 
zero and insignificant in most of the regressions,  suggesting that it is the 
contemporaneous  first difference of sales that matters for inventory in- 
vestment,  especially for small firms. The point estimates of the cash flow 
effects  increase in every regression  when compared with the results in 
table 4, and their standard errors are higher. The cash flow effects remain 
57.  See,  for example,  Himmelberg  and Petersen  (1994) and Kashyap,  Lamont,  and 
Stein (1994). 
58.  The coefficients  on the lags of cash flow in the first-stage regression for contempo- 
raneous cash flow are consistent from period to period. For small firms, the coefficients  on 
the first lag of cash flow are 0.353, 0.288, and 0.275 in periods 1-3. The coefficients  for the 
second  lag are 0.133, 0.089,  and 0.097.  For large firms, the coefficients  on the first lag of 
cash  flow are 0.274,  0.259,  and 0.185; the second-lag  coefficients  are 0.232,  0.092,  and 
0.104.  The first-stage R's for small firms range from 0.28 to 0.37 and those for large firms 
range from 0.20 to 0.33. 
59.  When the instrumental variables regressions are estimated with four-digit industry 
dummies,  the coefficients  are quite similar but the standard errors for cash flow rise by 
about 60 percent. This finding is consistent  with the view that lagged cash flow is a better 
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Table 6.  Instrumental Variable Regressions of Inventory Investmenta 
Small firnms  Laisge firnms 
Satmple per-iod  Stan darEd  StandarEd 
and independent  variableb  Coefficient  error  Coefficient  error 
Period  1, 1981:3-1984:1 
Lagged inventory stock (N,  I/TA,)  -  0.170  0.023  -0.147  0.027 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.077  0.022  -0.023  0.020 
(S,  l /TA,  1)  0.106  0.021  0.029  0.022 
(S,  2/TA, 2)  -0.011  0.016  -0.008  0.016 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,), instrumented  0.651  0.132  0.411  0.093 
Per-iod 2,  1984:2-1988:3 
Lagged inventory stock (N,  /TA,)  -  0.111  0.011  -  0.078  0.016 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  - 0.065  0.014  -  0.011  0.019 
(S,/ ITA,  1)  0.077  0.012  0.050  0.019 
(S,t2/TA,t2)  0.015  0.010  -0.039  0.012 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,), instrumented  0.439  0.066  0.471  0.087 
Per-iod 3,  1988:4-1992:4 
Lagged inventory stock (N,  /TA,)  -  0.127  0.011  -  0.099  0.018 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.077  0.014  0.043  0.018 
(S,  /TA,)  0.086  0.011  0.033  0.015 
(S,t2/TA,t2)  0.021  0.010  -0.003  0.012 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,), instrumented  0.398  0.054  0.134  0.068 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Compustat data. 
a.  The dependent variable is inventory investment (N,/TA,).  Regressions  were estimated with instrumental variables 
as  described  in the  text.  The  regressions  included  fixed  firm effects  and separate  quarter dummies  for each  firm. 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses  are  corrected  for  degrees  of  freedom  lost  due  to  the  dummy  variables  and  for 
heteroscedasticity  using White's  method. 
b.  Each variable has been divided  by the appropriately lagged total assets. 
significantly  different  from zero  for all the  regressions  (with  asymp- 
totic  t-statistics  ranging from 4.4 to 7.4),  except  for large firms in the 
third period, when cash flow is marginally significant. The pattern of co- 
efficients across the three panels is similar to the ordinary least squares 
results in table 4. The difference between  large and small firms remains 
significant in both the first and third periods.  Overall, the instrumental 
variables results strongly confirm the economic  importance of cash flow 
for inventory investment across firm size and time. 
Balance  Sheet  Effects  and Alternative  Sources  of Finance 
Because  of the importance of internal finance and its great volatility 
over the cycle,  we have been focusing on the effect of theflow of internal 108  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
finance on inventory investment.  Our work would be incomplete,  how- 
ever, if we did not consider the extent to which firms can use alternative 
sources  of finance to partially offset  fluctuations in the flow of internal 
finance. Some large firms have access to publicly traded debt, and surely 
most firms can obtain some bank debt.  New  short-term debt might be 
used to offset  fluctuations in internal finance.  Even  if firm financing is 
rationed in credit markets,  firms still may be able to partially insulate 
themselves  from internal-finance fluctuations by drawing down stocks 
of  cash  when  cash  flow  declines  and replenishing  those  stocks  when 
cash flow recovers. 
To measure the possible  effect of changes in cash stocks as a source 
of finance for inventory investment,  we include the change of cash and 
equivalents  in the regression.  The change of debt in current liabilities 
proxies for firms' new short-term debt issues.60 Because  these variables 
are endogenous,  the equation is estimated with instrumental variables. 
We use the beginning-of-period  stock  of cash and the stock of debt in 
current liabilities as instruments.6' The rationale for these  instruments 
is that the change in cash or short-term debt over a period will be related 
to the level  of its beginning-of-period  stock  (as in a stock-adjustment 
model). 
The results  appear in table 7 for the model  estimated  with quarter 
dummies at the four-digit SIC level.  Similar results were obtained (not 
shown) with the full set of time dummies. The coefficient on the change 
in cash and equivalents is negative and significant in all three periods for 
large firms. The magnitude of the coefficient  is also quite stable across 
periods for large firms. This negative sign is expected  if firms face finan- 
cing constraints and draw down stocks  of cash to finance inventory in- 
vestment.  For small firms, the change in cash is significant only in the 
first period. When the change in short-term debt is significant in table 7, 
it has a positive  coefficient  (for large firms in period  1, for small firms 
in periods 2 and 3). If firms face financing constraints,  we would expect 
access  to debt to increase their ability to finance all components  of in- 
vestment,  inventories  in particular.  For  our purposes,  the  most  im- 
60.  Compustat does not provide a separate variable for short-term debt alone. We also 
tried another variable to measure the stock of short-term liquidity, defined as cash plus 
accounts  receivable less accounts payable. This measure has small and insignificant coef- 
ficients in every regression. 
61.  This is the approach taken in Fazzari and Petersen (1993). Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari,  and Bruce C. Petersen  109 
Table 7.  Regressions of Inventory Investment with Alternative Sources of Fundsa 
Smnall  fir-ms  Lar-ge  fir  m.s 
Sanmple  per-iod  StandarEd  Standar-d 
and independent  variableb  Coefficient  error  Coefficient  error 
Period  1, 1981:3-1984:1 
Lagged inventory  stock (N,  l  /TA,)  - 0.183  0.022  -  0.183  0.030 
Sales  (S,/TA1)  -0.030  0.019  0.054  0.019 
(S  /  I  ITAJ 1)  0.091  0.021  0.024  0.022 
(S-,2/TA-,2)  -  0.008  0.019  -  0.009  0.019 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.270  0.060  0.155  0.047 
(CF, - /TA -  1)  0.166  0.065  0.108  0.044 
(CF,  -  /TA,  2)  0.035  0.068  0.024  0.048 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.471  0.074  0.287  0.053 
Change in short-term debt  -0.012  0.074  0.111  0.050 
Change in cash and equivalents  -0.130  0.070  -0.126  0.062 
Per-iod 2,  1984:2-1988:3 
Lagged  inventory  stock  (N  /  ITAJ)  -  0.127  0.011  -  0.097  0.015 
Sales  (S,/TA1)  -0.027  0.012  0.070  0.017 
(S/  I  ITAt 1)  0.075  0.012  0.026  0.019 
(S,t2/TA,t2)  0.002  0.010  -  0.039  0.012 
Cash  flow  (CF,/TA,)  0.157  0.027  0.075  0.028 
(CF, - /TA11)  0.045  0.023  0.097  0.025 
(CF,  2/TA ,  2)  0.092  0.023  0.059  0.020 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.294  0.031  0.231  0.034 
Change in short-term debt  0.095  0.029  -0.032  0.039 
Change in cash and equivalents  0.018  0.024  -0.114  0.040 
Per-iod 3,  1988:4-1992.4 
Lagged  inventory  stock  (N,  I/TA)  -  0.143  0.008  -  0.101  0.016 
Sales  (SJ/TA,)  -  0.027  0.009  0.061  0.015 
(S  /  I  ITA,  I1)  0.085  0.010  0.025  0.016 
(SJ1,/TAJ  2)  0.013  0.008  0.002  0.012 
Cash  flow  (CFJ/TAJ)  0.136  0.016  0.060  0.017 
(CFJ-  I  /TAJ  )  0.064  0.017  0.026  0.016 
(CF,-2/TA  -2)  0.034  0.016  -0.027  0.015 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.214  0.032  0.059  0.024 
Change in short-term debt  0.044  0.018  0.010  0.011 
Change in cash and equivalents  -0.016  0.023  -0.119  0.028 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Compustat data. 
a.  The dependent variable is inventory investment  (Nt/TA,).  Regressions  are estimated  with instrumental variables 
as described  in the text.  Time and firm dummies are included as described  in the note to table 4. Standard errors in 
parentheses  are corrected  for degrees  of freedom  lost due to the dummy variables and for heteroscedasticity  using 
White's  method. 
b.  Each variable has been  divided by the appropriately lagged total assets. 110  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
portant result in table 7 is that the cash flow effects  remain statistically 
and  economically  strong  even  after  accounting  for  other  sources  of 
short-term finance. 
The ability of a firm to offset  declines  in cash flow can also be mea- 
sured by the stocks  of debt and cash  on its balance  sheet.  Recent  re- 
search has raised concerns  that an increase  in leverage  has weakened 
firms' balance sheets.62 High leverage,  other things equal, might reduce 
the ability of firms to finance inventory investment with new debt. Simi- 
larly, as noted above,  cash stocks can provide liquidity for financing in- 
ventory investment.  To account for these balance sheet effects,  we add 
cash and short-term debt stocks to our primary specification and report 
the results in table 8. The debt variable has the expected  negative coef- 
ficient in five of the six regressions  and is statistically  significant in four 
instances.  The cash stock has the expected positive coefficient in four of 
the regressions.  Again, including these financial stock variables has little 
effect on the cash flow results, as compared with table 4. 
We also considered how changes in accounts receivable and accounts 
payable affect the cash flow results.  Like inventories,  these  entries on 
the balance sheet may be important uses and sources of internal finance 
and liquidity. Firms that face financing constraints may offer less gener- 
ous terms of payment,  thereby reducing accounts  receivable  and con- 
serving internal finance. Likewise,  stretching out payments to suppliers 
will conserve  internal finance in the short run. We modified the specifi- 
cation in equation 4 by including contemporaneous  and two lagged val- 
ues of the changes in both accounts  receivable  and accounts  payable in 
the regressions.  Although  these  variables  were typically  significant in 
the regressions (not shown), their inclusion had little impact on the cash 
flow coefficients. 
Sample  Split by Bond Ratings 
We have focused  on differences  in firm size to examine the heteroge- 
neity of finance effects.  To check the robustness of our findings, we also 
use the lack of a bond rating as a proxy for the presence of financing con- 
straints.63 Table 9 presents  regression  results with the sample divided 
62.  See, for example,  Friedman (1986) and Bernanke and Campbell (1988). 
63.  Whited (1992) and Kashyap,  Lamont, and Stein (1994) have argued that the exist- 
ence of a bond rating is a good indicator of access  to finance. Robert  E.  Carpenter,  Steven  M.  Fazzari,  and  Bruce  C. Petersen  111 
Table 8.  Regressions of Inventory Investment with Balance Sheet Stocksa 
Sinall firins  Lar-ge  fir  mns 
Sample  period  Stanidaird  Standar-d 
and independent  variableb  Coefficienit  error  Coefficient  error 
Period  1, 1981:3-1984:1 
Lagged inventory stock (N,  /TA,)  -0.220  0.027  -0.217  0.036 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.048  0.016  0.010  0.018 
(S,  l /TA,  1)  0.046  0.017  0.029  0.017 
(S,t2/TA,2)  0.040  0.016  0.039  0.016 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.160  0.058  0.115  0.047 
(CF,t I TA, 1)  0.149  0.063  0.127  0.043 
(CF,,/TA,-2)  0.081  0.064  -0.051  0.044 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.392  0.087  0.191  0.064 
Stock  of debt  -0.009  0.023  -0.048  0.015 
Stock  of cash  0.025  0.016  0.033  0.017 
Per-iod 2,  1984:2-1988:3 
Lagged inventory  stock (N,  I/TA,)  -0.146  0.011  -0.139  0.018 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.066  0.011  0.014  0.014 
(S,  l /TA,  1)  0.077  0.010  0.053  0.013 
(S,t21TA,2)  0.032  0.010  -0.010  0.011 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.170  0.025  0.064  0.028 
(CF,  I  /TA,  1)  0.031  0.023  0.082  0.025 
(CF,-21TA,-2)  0.056  0.024  0.059  0.020 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.257  0.034  0.205  0.037 
Stock  of debt  -0.042  0.011  0.007  0.014 
Stock  of cash  -0.004  0.005  0.017  0.008 
Per-iod 3,  1988:4-1992:4 
Lagged inventory  stock (N,l/TA,)  -0.186  0.011  -0.202  0.020 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.071  0.010  0.016  0.015 
(St  l /TAt  1)  0.087  0.010  0.058  0.015 
(St-2/TA,_2)  0.039  0.009  0.037  0.014 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.150  0.020  0.012  0.019 
(CFt  IITA l1)  0.025  0.018  -0.004  0.018 
(CF,-21TA,-2)  0.015  0.019  -0.011  0.018 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.190  0.028  -  0.003  0.030 
Stock  of debt  -0.022  0.006  -0.007  0.003 
Stock  of cash  -0.004  0.004  0.014  0.008 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Compustat data. 
a.  The dependent  variable is inventory  investment  (N,/TA,).  Time and firm dummies are included as described  in 
the  note  to  table  4.  Standard errors in parentheses  are corrected  for  degrees  of  freedom  lost  due  to  the  dummy 
variables and for heteroscedasticity  using White's  method. 
b.  Each variable has been divided by the appropriately lagged total assets. 112  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
Table 9.  Regressions of Inventory Investment with Data Split by Bond Ratinga 
Filrmns  wvithout  S&P  Filr)1s wit/i S&P 
bond r  ating  bond  m  atinig 
Sainple  per iod  Stanidar,d  Stan)dar-d 
anid inidependenit  variableb  Coefficient  error  Coefficient  error 
Period  1, 1981.3-1984:1 
Lagged inventory  (N,  I/TA,)  -  0.234  0.025  -0.269  0.026 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -  0.041  0.015  -  0.004  0.017 
(S,t  /TA,  1)  0.031  0.015  0.072  0.019 
(S,_,/TA,_,)  0.043  0.014  0.025  0.016 
Cash flow (CF,lTA,)  0.127  0.052  0.196  0.041 
(CF,- ITA,-1)  0.110  0.053  0.103  0.039 
(CF,  2  /TA,  2)  0.088  0.052  -0.077  0.048 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.325  0.075  0.222  0.070 
Adjusted  R2  0.386  ...  0.509  ... 
Per-iod 2,  1984.2-1988.3 
Lagged inventory  (N,  /TA,)  -0.177  0.012  -0.109  0.017 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -  0.055  0.011  0.008  0.016 
(S,t  /TA,  1)  0.077  0.010  0.034  0.016 
(S,_,/TA,_,)  0.032  0.009  0.001  0.012 
Cash flow (CF,/TA,)  0.155  0.025  0.092  0.031 
(CF,  I/TA, 1)  0.025  0.023  0.069  0.025 
(CF  -2/TAt-2)  0.074  0.023  0.020  0.021 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.254  0.036  0.181  0.035 
Adjusted  R2  0.338  ...  0.321  ... 
Per iod 3,  1988:4-1992:4 
Lagged inventory  (N,  I/TA,)  -  0.205  0.012  -0.173  0.025 
Sales  (S,/TA,)  -0.057  0.010  0.006  0.019 
(S  /  IITA,t1)  0.071  0.010  0.054  0.019 
(S  ,2/TA,  2)  0.046  0.009  0.047  0.015 
Cash flow (CF,lTA,)  0.130  0.019  0.031  0.022 
(CF  /  IITA1 1)  0.011  0.018  0.011  0.020 
(CF,  2/TA,-2)  0.026  0.018  0.008  0.019 
Sum of cash flow effects  0.167  0.027  0.050  0.034 
Adjusted  R'  0.238  ...  0.262  ... 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  from Compustat data. 
a.  The  dependent  variable is inventory  investment  (N,!TA,).  All equations  are estimated  with fixed firm effects. 
Quarter dummies are included for each four-digit SIC industry, as described in the text.  Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroscedasticity  using White's  method.  Standard errors are also  corrected  for degrees  of freedom  lost  due to 
the dummy variables.  The adjusted R2 statistics  exclude  variance explained  by the fixed firm effects. 
b.  Each variable has been  divided by the appropriately lagged total assets. according to whether a firm has or does  not have a Standard & Poor's 
bond rating. Again, the regressions  include four-digit quarter dummies 
to control for seasonal factors. The results were similar with the full set 
of time dummies. For the most part, only the largest corporations have 
publicly traded and rated debt, and the bond rating split reapportions the 
sample so that some medium and large firms are now grouped with the 
small firms in the no-bond  rating group.64  We find strong cash flow ef- 
fects  for both groups of firms in period  1, relatively  smaller cash flow 
coefficients  in period 3, and larger cash flow effects  for unrated firms 
than for rated firms in all three periods. These results are similar to our 
findings from the regressions based on firm size. 
Kashyap,  Lamont,  and Stein also use firm-level data to test for a li- 
quidity effect on inventory investment.  Their results are best compared 
with those in table 9 because  they split their data according to the pres- 
ence of a bond rating. One reason, however,  why our results are not di- 
rectly  comparable  with  theirs  is that they  use  the  stock  of  cash  and 
equivalents to measure liquidity rather than cash flow. With this caveat 
in mind, we compare the two sets of results.65 
We find a more pervasive  role for internal finance  than Kashyap, 
Lamont, and Stein, both across time and bond-rating categories.  In sep- 
arate cross-sections  that overlapped  with our data, their measure of li- 
quidity is significant for inventory investment  only in 1982 and only for 
firms without  bond  ratings.66 By  contrast,  we  find economically  im- 
portant effects for firms without bond ratings in all periods and for bond- 
rated firms in periods 1 and 2. There are two likely reasons for these dif- 
ferences.  First,  our results  are based  on quarterly rather than annual 
data. Because  of the flexibility of inventories  discussed  previously,  fi- 
nancial effects  on inventory  investment  may occur quickly,  and there- 
fore they may appear relatively weak at annual frequencies  even if they 
are significant at higher frequencies.  Second,  Kashyap,  Lamont,  and 
Stein estimate cross-sectional  regressions (between firms). By contrast, 
64.  This split puts 324, 510, and 670 firms in the group without bond ratings and 164, 
161, and 204 firms in the group with bond ratings for periods 1, 2, and 3 respectively. 
65.  See  Kashyap,  Lamont, and Stein (1994). When the beginning-of-period cash and 
equivalents variable is included in our regressions along with cash flow, the cash flow coef- 
ficients are hardly affected.  The stock of cash variable has a positive  coefficient  in most 
regressions but is only marginally significant. See the results in table 8. 
66.  Kashyap,  Lamont,  and Stein  (1994) also  report a significant liquidity effect  for 
1974, again only for their sample without bond riatings. we use the time dimension of our panels (within-firm variation) to esti- 
mate internal-finance effects.  The fact that we are able to control for firm 
and time effects is a likely reason for the stronger financial effects in our 
study. 
Internal Finance and the Aggregate Business Cycle 
From data covering a substantial fraction of manufacturing invento- 
ries,  our results show that inventory  movements  are linked to fluctua- 
tions  in internal finance.  Three facts  stand out: the economically  im- 
portant  cash  flow  coefficients  for  large  as  well  as  small  firms,  the 
dominant share of cash flow as a source of funds, and the dramatic pro- 
cyclical  movements  of cash flow. Collectively,  these facts help explain 
why  aggregate  inventory  investment  is  so  volatile  over  the  business 
cycle.  In this section, we explore the macroeconomic  significance of our 
results by examining the extent to which our point estimates,  together 
with cyclical  fluctuations in internal finance,  can explain aggregate in- 
ventory  movements.  We also  consider  how the presence  of financing 
constraints contributes to the differences in the size of inventory invest- 
ment shortfalls, along with other components  of investment, from reces- 
sion to recession. 
Internal Finance  and Aggregate  Inventory Investment 
There are several explanations  for the volatility of inventory invest- 
ment, including accelerator effects and cost or technological  shocks. We 
do not argue that these factors are unimportant. (Indeed, our results sup- 
port the significance of sales.)  Rather, we have tested  whether a "new 
view" about overall investment  instability is also important for inven- 
tory investment,  after controlling for other effects.  Broadly stated, this 
new  view  is that financing constraints  help to propagate the business 
cycle.  While not truly "new"-having  been articulated in some form by 
a variety of authors for decades-this  view has been revitalized in main- 
stream macroeconomics  by an outpouring of empirical and theoretical 
research.67 Our work is part of this new literature, focusing  on fluctua- 
67.  Finance is central to Keynes's  investment theory. Financial effects on investment 
also figure prominently in the research of Gurley and Shaw (1955), Davidson  (1972), and 
Minsky (1975). The surveys  by Bernanke (1993) and Gertler (1988) cover much of the re- 
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tions of internal finance as the key financial variable driving inventory 
investment. 
We are therefore led to the question of how much aggregate cyclical 
volatility of inventory investment  can be explained by internal finance. 
Clearly, the answer depends on the time period one examines,  and our 
regression  results cover  only the past two recessions.  Also,  one must 
use caution in extending our results based on Compustat manufacturing 
firms to the economy  as a whole. Nevertheless,  we present some sugges- 
tive  computations  to  illustrate the possible  importance  of  internal fi- 
nance for aggregate inventory investment. 
From the QFR  data for manufacturing firms, the shortfall in cash flow 
for manufacturing firms, relative to trend, was $44 billion for the early 
1980s recession  (in 1987 dollars); the shortfall in inventory investment 
was  $26.9 billion.68 Assume  that small firms account  for 35 percent of 
aggregate  inventories.69 Multiplying  the  sum  of  the  cash  flow  coeffi- 
cients from period 1 in table 4 for small firms (0.428) by 35 percent of the 
cash flow shortfall yields an inventory  investment  shortfall of $6.6 bil- 
lion for the early 1980s recession,  or about 25 percent of the actual short- 
fall. A similar calculation for large firms, with the sum of their cash flow 
coefficients  over the same period (0.227) multiplied by 65 percent of the 
cash flow shortfall, explains 24 percent of the aggregate inventory short- 
fall.  If one  attributes these  cash  flow effects  for both  small and large 
firms completely  to financing constraints,  the internal finance shortfall 
can explain nearly half of the inventory investment  shortfall during the 
early 1980s contraction.70 
68.  The geometric cash flow trend is estimated from a regression over the period that 
begins at the cyclical  peak in 1978:4 and ends at the peak in 1989:1. The use of a peak- 
to-peak sample avoids biasing the trend by including partial cycles.  Trend growth in real 
manufacturing cash flow for this period is 2.0 percent a year. Because  real inventory in- 
vestment  for QFR manufacturing firms was trendless  over this period, the inventory in- 
vestment shortfalls are measured relative to the sample average. 
69.  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) report that firms with nominal assets  less  than $250 
million accounted  for 32 percent of manufacturing sales in 1990. Since our cutoff is $300 
million in 1987 dollars, and because  the inventory-to-sales  ratio is higher for small firms 
than for large firms, we use a 35 percent wxeight  for small firms. 
70.  This  result  can  be  bracketed  with  our  estimates  from  other  regressions.  The 
smaller cash flow coefficients  from table 5 give a more modest,  but still substantial, result 
(25 percent of the inventory  shortfall for small and large firms together),  while the larger 
instrumental variables coefficients  (table 6) can explain over 80 percent of the inventory 
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For the early 1990s recession,  the results are somewhat different. The 
cash flow coefficients  in table 4 are smaller in this period.  There was, 
however,  a very large shortfall of nearly $90 billion in manufacturing 
cash flow, relative to trend. Using the coefficient estimates from table 4 
(period 3), the internal-finance shortfall for small firms again explains 
about 25 percent of the inventory  investment  shortfall, but finance ef- 
fects for large firms account for only 3 percent. 
Our rough calculations  suggest  that financing constraints  on  small 
firms alone could account for about a quarter of the shortfall in aggregate 
manufacturing inventory  investment  in both the early  1980s and early 
1990s. To the extent  that large firms also face  such constraints,  as re- 
flected by the positive  cash flow coefficients  in their inventory  invest- 
ment regression for the early 1980s, the cash flow shortfall for large firms 
also explains a large part of the reduction in inventory investment during 
this period. But the large-firm effect almost disappears in the early 1990s 
downturn. We now offer an explanation for this finding. 
Composition  of Investment  Shor-tfalls during Recessions 
A complete  theory of cyclical  inventory  investment  should explain 
not  only  cyclical  volatility  but  also  why  inventory  behavior  differs 
across cycles.  In our context,  the question is the composition  of short- 
falls in total investment for a given reduction of internal finance. That is, 
how much of a cash flow shortfall will be reflected in reduced inventory 
investment as opposed to other firm activities,  such as fixed investment? 
In his classic  work on business  cycles,  Moses  Abramovitz  reports 
evidence  relevant to this issue.71  He finds an inverse  relation between 
the length of cyclical  phases  and the change in inventory  investment. 
For phases that last less than a year, inventory investment accounts for 
96 percent of the change in output. For phases of moderate duration (1.5 
to 2.25 years), 47 percent of the change in output comes from inventory 
investment.  For  the  two  long  phases  Abramovitz  studied  (each  ex- 
ceeded  3.75 years), changes of inventory investment amount to only  19 
percent  of the change  in output.  Blinder and Maccini report statistics 
with similar implications for postwar recessions.  For the two most se- 
vere recessions  covered  by their statistics  (1974-75  and 1981-82),  de- 
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clines in inventory investment averaged 53 percent of the drop in output; 
while  in the other recessions,  they  averaged 98 percent  of the output 
drop. Zarnowitz reviews  the historical record and confirms these facts: 
"[i]nventory investment  plays a very important role in short and mild 
cycles,  whereas fluctuations in fixed investment acquire a greater weight 
in the longer and larger cycles."72 
The experience  in the two most recent recessions  provides additional 
information on the composition  issue.  Robert Hall shows that the short- 
fall in fixed investment  is about three times as large as the shortfall in 
inventory  investment,  measured  as deviations  from trend over  1989- 
91.73  A similar calculation for 1981-83 gives  a shortfall in fixed invest- 
ment that is only  36 percent  larger than the shortfall in inventory  in- 
vestment. 
The link between internal finance and inventory investment helps ex- 
plain these  observations.  We  have  argued that the  amount by which 
firms cut inventory investment,  compared with fixed investment,  when 
internal finance declines will depend on the relative marginal costs of re- 
ducing each component.  In short recessions,  the low adjustment and liq- 
uidation costs of inventories induce firms to offset much of their shortfall 
in cash flow with lower, even negative, inventory investment.  As inven- 
tories are depleted during a protracted recession,  however,  the opportu- 
nity cost of further liquidation rises as the marginal product of invento- 
ries  rises.  Similarly,  if  firms  enter  a  recession  with  unusually  low 
inventory stocks,  they will find it more costly  to deplete inventories.  In 
either of these  cases,  fixed investment  will likely bear a larger burden 
of the shortfall in cash flow.74 In earlier work, we analyzed this kind of 
connection  between  fixed  and  working-capital  investment  (much  of 
which is inventories)  and found that working-capital investment  is very 
sensitive  to cash flow.  Furthermore,  the evidence  indicates  that firms 
use  declines  in working-capital  investment  to  "smooth" fixed invest- 
ment relative to negative cash flow shocks.75 
This perspective  helps explain differences  in the composition  of ag- 
gregate-investment  reductions  between  the past  two  recessions.  The 
72.  Blinder and Maccini (199la) and Zarnowitz (1992, p. 27). 
73.  Hall (1993, figure 3). 
74.  This argument relates to research emphasizing the strength of firms' balance sheets 
as a determinant of investment.  See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1990), and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992). 
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manufacturing and trade inventory-to-sales  ratio fell during most of the 
1980s.76  This phenomenon could be due to changes in inventory manage- 
ment procedures-adoption  of the much publicized  "just-in-time" ap- 
proach, for example.  Under these circumstances,  firms would have had 
less flexibility to liquidate inventory stocks when cash flow weakened in 
the late 1980s and into the 1990s. This interpretation is consistent  with 
our regression  results: the cash flow coefficients  decline  substantially 
for both small and large firms between  our first and third periods. 
Our view  of the linkage between  internal finance and the multiple 
components  of investment is different from conventional  analyses of in- 
ventories  that  treat  inventory  changes  as  an  isolated  phenomenon. 
Many authors have concluded  that macroeconomic  fluctuations would 
be substantially less  severe,  indeed some  cycles  may cease  to exist,  if 
inventories  were  more  stable.  For example,  Rudiger Dornbusch  and 
Stanley Fischer write, 
If inventories  could  be kept  more  closely in line with  sales, or aggregate  demand, 
fluctuations  in inventory  investment  and  in GNP would  be reduced.  As business 
methods  are improving  all the time, the hope is often expressed  that new meth- 
ods of management  will enable  firms  to keep tighter  control  over their  invento- 
ries and  thus the prospects  for steadier  growth  can be improved.77 
If internal-finance flows are an important determinant of inventory fluc- 
tuations,  however,  this conventional  view is incomplete.  Firms that do 
not respond to reduced cash flow by cutting inventory investment  must 
still  satisfy  financing constraints.  Cash  flow  shocks  will  then  have  a 
larger impact on other firm activities,  such as fixed investment,  employ- 
ment, and R&D.78  Therefore,  highly procyclical  inventory fluctuations 
might be viewed in part as symptoms  of the deeper problem created by 
financing constraints.  Unless  the underlying fluctuations of internal fi- 
nance are dampened, reduced inventory volatility might not contribute 
as much to macroeconomic  stability as it might appear. 
76.  See, for example,  Morgan (1  99 1). 
77.  Dornbusch and Fischer (1990, p. 307). 
78.  Aggregate data presented  by Kopcke  (1993, figure 4) support the idea that fixed 
investment  and inventories compete  with each other for cash flow. He finds that fixed in- 
vestment  nearly equals cash flow over a long horizon, which is not surprising since inven- 
tory investment  is a small use of funds in the long term. But fixed investment  rises about 
30 percent above cash flow in both the 1981-82 and 1990-91 recessions,  just at the time of 
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Conclusion 
A well-known  but underemphasized  feature of the business  cycle  is 
that the flow of internal finance is very procyclical.  It is also well known 
that internal finance is the predominant source of funds for most firms 
in the U.S.  economy.  Recent research indicates that access  to internal 
finance constrains  firms' investment  expenditures,  suggesting  that the 
dramatic fluctuations in internal finance in the U.S.  economy may be im- 
portant for explaining the pronounced cyclical  movements  in aggregate 
investment. 
Internal finance is used to fund many different investment activities, 
including fixed investment  and R&D. However,  we argue that because 
of relatively  low adjustment costs,  inventories  often bear a dispropor- 
tionate share of internal-finance fluctuations. Inventories are a large pro- 
portion of firms' assets  and are readily reversible.  For example,  firms 
can  obtain liquidity by reducing the rate at which  they  replenish  the 
stock of raw materials. Because  the stock of inventories  is so large rela- 
tive to quarterly cash flow for the typical firm in our study, a compara- 
tively small percentage decline in the stock of inventories would be suf- 
ficient to offset  even  the large percentage  reductions  in cash flow that 
occur in recessions. 
To test the linkage between  internal finance and inventories,  we use 
quarterly panel data for manufacturing firms, which cover a large frac- 
tion of aggregate inventories.  To our knowledge,  this study is the first to 
test  for  the  importance  of  financing  constraints  with  high-frequency 
panel  data.  There  are  several  methodological  advantages  to  this  ap- 
proach,  including the ability to employ  highly disaggregated  industry 
time dummies to control for alternative explanations  of inventory vola- 
tility,  such as technological  shocks  and interest rates. In addition,  our 
study may be the first to examine individual  recessions  using panel tech- 
niques, which can be done only with high-frequency data. 
Our results strongly support the view that firms absorb shocks to in- 
ternal finance through changes  in inventory  investment.  The findings 
from three separate panels indicate that internal finance has a stronger 
effect on inventory investment  for small firms than for large firms. The 
effect is economically  important, however,  even for large firms in two of 
our three panels.  That cash  flow affects  large firms' inventory  invest- 120  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
ment helps establish  the importance of internal-finance fluctuations to 
aggregate movements  in inventory investment. 
Inventory fluctuations often account for a majority of the decline  in 
output during recessions,  and our results help explain this phenomenon. 
We argue, however,  that the dampening of inventory  movements  will 
not necessarily  reduce cyclical  fluctuations in the aggregate economy. 
Fluctuations  in internal finance must be absorbed  somewhere,  and in 
many recessions,  inventory disinvestment  is the method firms choose. 
However,  if inventory  stocks  are low going into a recession,  or if they 
are drawn down  during a prolonged  recession,  financing constraints 
should have a greater impact on other firm activities,  particularly fixed 
investment.  This observation  helps to explain major differences  in the 
composition  of investment shortfalls in previous business cycles. 
APPENDIX 
Characteristics of Data 
COMPUSTAT  contains data compiled  in a fiscal year format. Compustat 
aligns the fiscal quarters in the data with calendar quarters as follows.  If 
the company's  fiscal quarter ends in the same month as a calendar quar- 
ter, the adjustment is straightforward. In cases where the end of a firm's 
fiscal quarter does  not coincide  with the end of a calendar quarter, we 
adjust the data so that the majority of the fiscal quarter is assigned to the 
appropriate calendar quarter. 
Cash flow is defined as income  before extraordinary items plus the 
sum of noncash charges against income.  The bulk of these charges con- 
sist of depreciation and amortization expenses.  The remaining charges 
are extraordinary items and discontinued  operations,  equity in net loss, 
and deferred taxes.  The sales variable reported by Compustat is net of 
cash and trade discounts  and other allowances  for which customers  re- 
ceive  credit. To construct  a real measure for sales,  we divide sales by 
the implicit GNP price deflator. We use the implicit price deflator for 
nonresidential investment to construct all other real variables. 
A clear explanation of the standard accounting treatment of invento- 
ries and current income can be found in a book by Ray Garrison.79  He 
79.  Garrison (1982). Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari, and Bruce C. Petersen  121 
notes that product costs go into the manufacture of goods and consist of 
materials and direct labor costs.  He then states that 
Product  costs are often called inventoriable costs. The reason is that partially 
completed  units  or unsold  units  go into  inventory,  and  the costs involved  in their 
manufacture  follow them  into the inventory  accounts. Thus, such costs are said 
to be inventoriable costs. The concept of an inventoriable  or product  cost is a 
key concept in managerial  accounting,  since these costs can end up on the bal- 
ance sheet as assets  (either  as work  in process or as finished  goods) if manufac- 
tured  products  are  only partially  completed  or are  unsold  at the end of a period.80 
Therefore,  firms do not affect their income  or cash flow simply as the 
result of inventory  investment.  The costs  of producing goods  put into 
inventory are not reflected in income until the goods are sold. 
Compustat reports book values for inventories as well as the method 
that a company  uses  to value its inventory.  Firms may use more than 
one method to evaluate their inventories.  If so, Compustat indicates the 
predominant method. We adjust both the lagged stock of inventories and 
the inventory  investment  variable in our regressions  to minimize  the 
bias introduced by historical cost accounting. The value of the stock of a 
firm's inventory will be understated in an inflationary environment when 
inventories are evaluated with LIFO methods. To adjust, we group firms 
into LIFO and non-LIFO categories.  For LIFO firms, we apply an algo- 
rithm developed  by Michael  Salinger and Lawrence  Summers to esti- 
mate a replacement value for the inventory stock.81 For FIFO firms, the 
change  in inventories  will be overstated  if there is a positive  inflation 
rate, because  the end-of-period value will include the nominal inflation 
of the stocks.  To remove the inflation bias from FIFO firms' inventory 
investment variable, we compute the change in inventories  after deflat- 
ing the stocks.  For LIFO firms, we construct the flow measure of inven- 
tory investment by differencing the stock and then deflating. 
The seasonal adjustment procedure described in the text generates an 
inventory  investment  series  that closely  resembles  the seasonally  ad- 
justed change in nonfarm business  manufacturing inventories  compiled 
by the Census Bureau. Figure Al  shows  the close  correspondence  be- 
tween the aggregate manufacturing inventory investment  series and the 
means of our inventory investment  data, seasonally  adjusted with four- 
80.  Garrison (1982, p. 34). 
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Figure Al.  Inventory Investmenta 
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a.  Aggregate manufacturing inventory  investment  (left scale)  is shown  in millions of  1987 dollars.  Micro inventory 
investment  data (right scale) are divided by beginning-of-period total assets  and are seasonally  adjusted with quarterly 
dummy variables. 
digit SIC quarter dummies. Our data capture very well the major move- 
ments in aggregate inventory  investment  during the sample period.  In 
addition,  an examination  of the partial autocorrelation  function of our 
series, after accounting for seasonal fluctuations with dummy variables, 
indicates  that no partial autocorrelation  function  is significant at sea- 
sonal frequencies. Comments 
and Discussion 
Anil K. Kashyap:  This paper nicely marries Robert Carpenter's disser- 
tation work on inventories and Steven Fazzari and Bruce Petersen's  re- 
search on internal finance. The resulting product is an interesting blend 
of careful work on an important topic. Indeed, I think the results are suf- 
ficiently convincing that rather than quibbling with details of the empiri- 
cal work, I will spend most of my time discussing an alternative interpre- 
tation of their results. 
Let me start by reviewing what I see as the three main findings of the 
paper: 
-During  the early and late 1980s, small firms' inventory investment 
was more sensitive  to internal funds than was the inventory  invest- 
ment of large firms. (The large-firm cash flow effects  are only signifi- 
cant in one of the four cases  shown tables 4 and 5.) 
-During  the mid-1980s, there was no important difference between 
the small and large firms' inventory  sensitivity  to cash flow-see  the 
middle panels of tables 4 and 5. 
-These  findings are very robust to alternative specifications,  and in 
particular there is little evidence  to suggest that interest rate-cost  of 
capital considerations  have much to do with inventory fluctuations. 
In fact,  Owen  Lamont,  Jeremy  Stein,  and I,  as well  as others,  have 
found these  same sorts of results using lower-frequency  data and fewer 
econometric controls. I It is reassuring to see that the stylized facts really 
do not collapse following careful econometric  work. 
Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen read this evidence as saying that, as 
a typical recession  unfolds, internal finance falls, and as a result of capi- 
1.  For example,  see Kashyap,  Lamont, and Stein (1994). 
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tal market imperfections  that limit firms' ability to borrow,  firms are 
forced to cut spending. These  cuts  show up in inventories  because  in- 
ventories are easily adjusted and the cuts serve to exacerbate the down- 
turn-a  mechanism sometimes  described as the financial accelerator.2 
While I mostly agree with their characterization,  I would change the 
emphasis of the story. My main concern is that I think the authors under- 
state the connection  between  this work and the monetary policy trans- 
mission  mechanism.  To see  the connection  to the monetary transmis- 
sion  mechanism  one  must  first  buy  the  assumption  that  the  main 
macroeconomic  difference between  the three periods that they study is 
the stance of monetary policy:  each of their episodes  includes  a slow- 
down in income followed by a recovery and an accompanying inventory 
cycle.  Most observers would agree that credit conditions were tighter in 
the first and third periods than in the middle period. In fact, I suspect all 
regular Brookings panel participants would agree that the Federal Re- 
serve probably would have triggered a recession  by gently raising rates 
in 1985 and 1986 (rather than lowering them). 
Reinterpreting  their results  in light of  this  characterization  of  the 
three episodes  suggests the small firm-large firm differentials are much 
more pronounced during the tight money episodes.  Why is this conclu- 
sion  noteworthy?  The  standard  approach  of  the  papers  that  were 
spawned by Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard, and Petersen's  1988 paper is to 
take coefficients for large firms as a benchmark that controls for possible 
econometric  misspecification  and to read the differences between  coef- 
ficients for the large and small firms as a measure of the importance of 
capital market imperfections.3  Using  this logic  suggests  that these  im- 
perfections are primarily important during periods of tight monetary pol- 
icy. More specifically,  the present authors can be interpreted as having 
demonstrated  that because  of capital market imperfections,  monetary 
policy operates partially by affecting inventory investment. 
This alternative  interpretation has a number of interesting implica- 
tions.  First, it helps resolve  the following  long-standing puzzle.  As the 
authors mention,  it is well-known  that in postwar U.S.  recessions,  de- 
clines  in inventory  investment  account for a large fraction of the total 
peak-to-trough movement  in GNP.4 It is also generally agreed that re- 
2.  See Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (forthcoming). 
3.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). 
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cessions  usually follow a period of tight monetary policy.  Yet, the obvi- 
ous  connection  that links  the  inventory  decline  to  increased  interest 
rates is very difficult to establish.  As Alan Blinder and Louis  Maccini 
put it in their recent survey,  "little influence of real interest rates on in- 
ventory investment  can be found empirically."5 (Recall that Carpenter, 
Fazzari, and Petersen can find no evidence  of inventory investment  de- 
pending on interest rates. In fact most of their estimated  interest rates 
effects  have  the  wrong  sign: higher rates  lead  to  more  inventory  in- 
vestment.) 
The authors' evidence,  therefore,  suggests that it is inappropriate to 
dismiss the "financial" account  of the cyclical  behavior of inventories: 
instead of keying on how monetary policy might operate though interest 
rates, these results highlight the potency  that might arise because  it can 
significantly affect access  to credit. Put differently, their evidence  dem- 
onstrates  the  importance  of  thinking  about  the  connection  between 
monetary policy and firms' access  to credit. 
What are the links between  monetary policy and credit availability? 
There are a couple of potential channels.  One way that tight monetary 
policy could operate without relying on a strong cost-of-capital  channel 
is for it to influence collateral values. For example, periods of high inter- 
est rates are times when the collateral value of future cash receipts falls. 
In a world of information and moral hazard problems, any drop in collat- 
eral values can decrease  access  to financing. 
A slightly different mechanism  emphasizes  the importance of banks 
in the monetary policy  transmission  mechanism.  Because  the Federal 
Reserve  raises interest rates by contracting bank reserves,  a tightening 
of monetary policy (empirically) tends to lead to less lending by banks ;6 
one of the margins on which banks can operate to offset  the shock  to 
reserves  is to reduce  lending.  With less  bank lending available,  some 
firms may have to reduce  inventory  investment  during a time of tight 
monetary policy. 
Clearly, the collateral story and the lending story are closely  related. 
Both attribute inventory  movements  in a downturn to a "cutoff'  in the 
flow of credit, although in the latter case the cutoff represents an inward 
shift in the bank loan supply schedule,  while in the former it does  not. 
5.  Blinder and Maccini (1991a, p. 82). 
6.  Bernanke and Blinder (1992). 126  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Similarly,  both  stories  suggest  that  standard  theoretical  inventory 
models need to be expanded to include more than just interest rates to 
properly capture the role of financial factors.  Neverthless,  I think that 
distinguishing  between  these  two  explanations  for the cutoff in credit 
that may accompany  a monetary tightening is important. The sorts of 
questions  that hinge on separating the collateral  and lending explana- 
tions include 
-Will  the ongoing transformation of the banking industry change the 
potency  of monetary policy? 
-Should  the Federal  Reserve  be looking  at some  index  of banks' 
lending positions  to gauge the stance of monetary policy? 
-Does  the potency  of monetary policy  in different economies  vary 
with the size or health of their banking systems? 
While at this point it is too early to say whether  either explanation  is 
more important than the other, this topic is being actively  studied, and I 
am optimistic that we will be able to say much more in another couple of 
years.7 
Finally,  I should mention that the analysis in the paper begins at the 
point where sales are already slowing down and cash flow is beginning 
to fall. This paper, therefore, is silent about the source of the initial im- 
pulse that leads to the slump that triggers the inventory runoff. Ideally, 
a complete  theory would also explain how the shock originated. One in- 
triguing possibility is that tight monetary policy, through its effect on ac- 
cess to credit, is the cause.  In this case,  the channel would have to oper- 
ate through a reduction in access  to funds to individuals and other final 
purchasers of inventories. 
The idea that banks cut back on lending to individuals and other small 
customers  before  cutting  off larger businesses  is plausible.  After all, 
smaller customers  are likely to be more costly  to service  and generally 
will not have the kind of tight long-term relationship with a bank that a 
larger business  would.  There is also some indirect evidence  suggesting 
that empirically bank lending to households  gets squeezed more quickly 
during tight episodes than does lending to firms. For instance,  Lawrence 
Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum,  and Charles Evans show that noncor- 
7.  See Cecchetti  (1994), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), Hubbard (1994), and Kas- 
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porate bank lending falls more quickly following  an increase in interest 
rates than does corporate borrowing.8 
This conjecture  about how  monetary  policy  might cause  the initial 
drop  in  internal  funds  has  several  testable  implications.  First,  one 
should find that the response  of bank lending to a change in monetary 
policy  differs across  the type of customers.  As a practical matter, one 
would want to know whether lending to consumers  drops quickly fol- 
lowing  a monetary  tightening.  Second,  this conjecture  has cross-sec- 
tional implications about the nature of the inventory runoff that follows 
a shift in monetary policy:  firms whose  customers  depend on financing 
their purchases with bank loans should be the ones that are most likely 
to see a sales decline.  I am unaware of any tests  of these propositions, 
but checking them out seems like a next step in trying more completely 
to understand Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen's  results. 
In the meantime, I hope the results in this paper will at least lead peo- 
ple to reconsider the relevance  of standard models of inventory invest- 
ment: most graduate students are now introduced to inventories  in the 
context  of the debate over production smoothing.9 Indeed, in the bench- 
mark linear-quadratic model of production cost  minimization,  the role 
of financial factors is subsumed into a discount rate that is often not even 
estimated.  Regardless  of exactly  how one interprets the evidence  pre- 
sented by the authors, their evidence  should convince  everyone  that the 
role of financial factors in the determination of inventories  is much too 
rich to summarize using a single interest rate. 
Benjamin  M. Friedman:  One of the greatest disappointments  in post- 
war  empirical  macroeconomics  has  been  our  poor  success  in  ex- 
plaining-and,  correspondingly,  our virtually complete  failure in pre- 
dicting-fluctuations  in nonfinancial firms' accumulation of inventories. 
The ups and downs of inventory investment account, arithmetically, for 
a large share of what we conventionally  call business  cycles.  To a great 
degree,  economists'  well-known  difficulty in predicting recessions  has 
stemmed from our inability to anticipate movements in inventory invest- 
ment. All this has not been for lack of trying. Given the quantitative im- 
portance of inventory investment in the variance of the growth of aggre- 
gate demand, numerous economists,  including some writing in the pages 
8.  Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (forthcoming). 
9.  West (1986). 128  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
of the BPEA,  have attempted to model this aspect  of macroeconomic 
behavior.  But the returns to doing so have mostly fallen short. 
Many of the researchers engaged in this effort over the years have ex- 
pressed  an a priori belief  that financial conditions-somehow  and in 
some form-ought  to matter for firms' inventory  decisions.  Efforts to 
establish empirical support for financial influences on inventory invest- 
ment, however,  have mostly been frustrated (and, presumably, frustrat- 
ing as well). A large part of the reason, I suspect,  lies in the conventional 
use of one or another market interest rate to gauge how what happens 
in the financial markets affects  decisions  by nonfinancial actors in the 
economy,  firms included.  That usage  in turn is a reflection  of the as- 
sumption of perfect capital markets, which was forcefully reintroduced 
into the investment  literature by Dale  Jorgenson  and others  some  30 
years  ago.1 The assumption  of perfect  capital markets means  (among 
other things) that any firm wishing to borrow at "the going interest rate" 
can do so.  Moreover,  given the Modigliani-Miller result on the irrele- 
vance of debt-equity  structure, a perfect capital market further implies 
that any firm wishing to borrow at the going interest rate can do so in 
unlimited amounts.2 Firms, therefore,  are presumed to be strictly price 
takers and quantity setters in the debt market, and "the going interest 
rate" is a sufficient statistic embodying all information from the financial 
markets that is relevant to their decisions. 
By contrast,  within the past 15 years or so, a new literature of finan- 
cial markets-pioneered  by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, Michael 
Jensen and William Meckling,  Stewart Myers and Nicholas  Majluf, and 
others-has  established  a solid theoretical basis for rejecting the notion 
that capital markets are perfect in this important sense.3 Where previ- 
ously  a researcher seeking to incorporate ideas of credit rationing and 
financial quantity constraints into applied research had to face the chal- 
lenge of "where is your optimizing model?," and the associated  criticism 
of basing empirical work on "ad hoc" constructs,  today it is researchers 
seeking  to base  models  of investment  expenditures  on perfect  capital 
markets who should appropriately explain their justification for assum- 
ing away the well-understood  consequences  of asymmetric information, 
1.  Jorgenson (1963). 
2.  Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
3.  StiglitzandWeiss  (1981), Jensen and Meckling(1976),  and Myers and Majluf(1984). Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari, and Br-uce  C. Petersen  129 
moral hazard, adverse  selection,  and conflicts  between  principals and 
their agents.  That conventional  research  practice  in macroeconomics 
has thus far made only a limited shift in this direction mostly reflects the 
economics  profession's  usual bias toward the presumption  of perfect 
markets. 
Carpenter, Fazzari,  and Petersen usefully  seek to explore inventory 
investment  on the assumption that most nonfinancial firms have limited 
access  (or none at all) to external financing and, further, that even  the 
first dollar of  whatever  external  funds  are available  comes  at a cost 
greater than the opportunity cost of internally generated funds. The rele- 
vant supply curve describing the individual firm's investment  possibili- 
ties, which Jorgenson-type models take to be horizontal, is therefore not 
only not horizontal but discontinuous.  Internal cash flow, which is the 
primary focus  of the authors' empirical work in this paper, matters be- 
cause  it determines the location  (the horizontal coordinate) of that dis- 
continuity  in the supply curve.  The empirical results presented  in the 
paper, based  on panel data that are not only highly disaggregated but 
also fairly comprehensive  as these things go, provide strong support for 
the claim that the location of this discontinuity  in the supply of finance 
is in turn an important factor in inventory decisions for many firms, both 
large and small. The specific results are mostly  robust, and the overall 
message  is persuasive.  Indeed,  I would  view  the authors' finding that 
financing constraints were less relevant than usual during the subsample 
including the  1990-91  recession  less  as cause  for doubt about the ro- 
bustness  of the underlying relationship than as further confirmation of 
the widespread view, also expressed  recently in BPEA,  that the 1990-91 
recession  was itself unusual in not having been proximately caused by 
tight monetary policy.4 
Although  the authors do not say so explicitly,  the strength of their 
findings should also go a good way toward resolving  the long-standing 
question of why "accelerator" models of investment tend to perform so 
well empirically. Most economists  are aware that accelerator models- 
that is, models in which the key determinant of investment is the change 
in sales-lack  the solid theoretical foundation that supports either the 
Jorgenson-style  neoclassical  model or models based on Tobin's q ratio. 
Yet accelerator models typically outperform either neoclassical  models 
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or "q" models in empirical comparisons.  The results presented here sug- 
gest a plausible explanation: the change in sales,  on which accelerator 
models  focus,  is often a good proxy for either profits or internal cash 
flow, and in a model with imperfect capital markets that financial flow 
should, on perfectly sound theoretical grounds, be a major determinant 
of investment.  As the authors explain,  there is good reason to believe 
that the relevance of the cash flow constraint is all the greater in the par- 
ticular case of inventory investment. 
My principal reservation about the authors' work here stems from the 
partial nature of their analysis,  in the sense  not only  of partial versus 
general equilibrium but also of analysis  of only one element  in what is 
presumably a simultaneous set of decisions  by the firm. In both senses, 
the problem comes  down to a difficulty in specifying just  what exoge- 
nous shock is under analysis. 
For example,  in table 7 the authors report that the change in cash and 
equivalents  held by the firm affects  inventory  investment  negatively. 
Negative  variation between  cash holdings  and inventories  makes per- 
fect sense if both variables are responding to an exogenous  shock in cash 
flow. When cash flow declines,  drawing down cash holdings and cutting 
back on inventories are substitute ways of achieving the needed accom- 
modation, and the more the firm draws down its cash holdings the more 
it can go ahead and invest in inventories.  But these equations control for 
cash flow, and so the independent  shock represented by the cash hold- 
ings variable is hard to specify.  To take just one hypothetical  example, 
if cash holdings go down because  the firm has suffered a default in its 
liquid securities  portfolio,  the inventory  response  (if any) would  pre- 
sumably be to accumulate  less,  and so the sign of the effect  would be 
positive.  The ambiguity here simply reflects the use,  as an independent 
regressor,  of a variable on which  the firm is deciding  simultaneously 
with its inventory  decisions.  The same argument holds,  with signs re- 
versed, for the change in short-term debt. (One could even make the ar- 
gument that inventory decisions  and outcomes  are prior  to decisions  on 
cash holdings and short-term debt outstanding.) The authors' use of in- 
struments for these  variables clearly indicates  their awareness  of this 
matter, but that does  not make it go away.  What is needed  is a fuller 
treatment encompassing  inventory and portfolio decisions  together. 
The limitation in the authors' analysis  due to its partial equilibrium 
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rejection of the familiar notion that "macroeconomic  fluctuations would 
be substantially less  severe  ...  if inventories  were more stable." The 
authors' argument here takes a negative shock to the aggregate cash flow 
of all firms as given,  and assumes  that firms that do not accommodate 
this shock by cutting back on inventory accumulation will therefore cut 
back on "other firm activities,  such as fixed investment,  employment, 
and R&D." But if on average firms have  not cut back on their buying 
from one another, where has the negative shock to aggregate  cash flow 
come from in the first place? (Recall how smooth consumption spending 
typically is over the business  cycle.)  And even if the aggregate of firms 
does  somehow  experience  a negative  cash flow shock,  why can it not 
achieve the needed accommodation by drawing down cash holdings? Or 
by taking on more debt? The answer to this latter question, of course,  is 
that many firms have little or no cash holdings to draw down,  and in a 
world of imperfect capital markets they also have little or no access  to 
external finance. This, after all, is the authors' fundamental point. But 
establishing  its relevance  and implications  in a business  cycle  context 
again requires a fuller model, capable not only of clearly specifying the 
shocks under study but also incorporating firms' actions in both financial 
and nonfinancial markets. 
In their paper the authors have usefully pushed us along this path by 
providing strong-to  me,  persuasive-evidence  of the effect  of finan- 
cing constraints on a key element of economic  behavior at the individual 
firm level: finance is an important determinant of inventory investment. 
That there is much work yet to be done in establishing  the macroeco- 
nomic  implications  of this relationship  in no way  diminishes  the use- 
fulness  of the evidence  demonstrating it. 
General Discussion 
Gregory Mankiw raised the possibility  that the estimated  effect  of 
cash flow on inventories does not reflect financing constraints but arises 
because cash flow is correlated with expectations  of future profitability, 
which  affects  desired  stocks.  Steven  Fazzari  responded  that such  an 
omitted-variable bias was unlikely to be important because  inventories 
represent short-term investments  with low adjustment costs,  so that ex- 
pectations of future profitability should not matter much. He noted that 132  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
such expectations  should be more important in explaining fixed invest- 
ment than in explaining inventories.  However,  the estimated effects  of 
cash  flow  turn out  to  be  larger in explaining  inventories  than in ex- 
plaining fixed investment,  suggesting that expectations  of future profit- 
ability are not driving the estimates. 
Charles  Schultze  questioned  whether  adjusting inventories  is  less 
costly  than adjusting fixed capital since adjusting finished-goods  inven- 
tories requires changing employment,  which may be more costly  than 
simply  delaying  investment  projects.  Fazzari  agreed that adjustment 
costs  could be high for finished-goods  inventories,  but not for materials 
inventories,  which firms can simply draw down in the course of produc- 
tion. In aggregate data-and  probably in their data-materials  invento- 
ries account for a large portion of the variance in total inventories.  Un- 
fortunately,  the data in the paper do not allow disaggregation by type of 
inventory. 
Fazzari also noted that if cash flow were just signalling future profit- 
ability, it should be significant across  all firm types and periods.  How- 
ever,  cash flow is insignificant for large firms in the last sample period. 
Robert Carpenter added that, when  the sample is split into three size 
classes,  the cash flow coefficients  for the largest and smallest firms are 
significantly different in all three periods.  Mankiw responded  that the 
omitted-variable bias might simply be greater in the case of small firms; 
because  they face more uncertainty about future prospects,  the correla- 
tion between  current cash flow and future profitability should be larger 
for them than for large firms. To test  the omitted-variable  hypothesis 
against the credit constraint hypothesis,  Robert Hall suggested focusing 
on cash flow windfalls,  since they would ease financing constraints but 
would be unrelated to future profitability. 
Some panelists  suggested  that alternative sample splits might be in- 
formative.  Glenn Hubbard noted that the key is to identify firms with a 
high shadow value of internal funds, suggesting splits based on whether 
firms pay dividends  or whether  they  have  access  to the commercial- 
paper market. These  splits are unlikely  to be affected  by uncertainty 
about the future. Kevin Hassett  suggested a split between types of small 
firms: "buggy whip" companies whose markets are small and stable and 
"biotech" companies  that are small but have the potential to grow rap- 
idly. For buggy whip firms, cash flow probably is not highly correlated 
with future sales growth,  since these  firms are unlikely to grow much. Robert E. Carpenter, Steven M. Fazzari,  and Bruce C. Petersen  133 
Therefore, if cash flow affects inventories for these firms, financing con- 
straints are the likely channel.  By contrast, cash flow for the "biotech" 
firms is likely to be highly correlated with future profitability. As a possi- 
ble way to identify these firms, Hassett suggested splitting the small-firm 
sample by industry or age of company.  Stephen Oliner noted that if fi- 
nancing constraints are the reason for the effects  of cash flow, the coef- 
ficients on cash flow should be larger in periods of tight financial condi- 
tions than in periods of easy money.  With such a split in mind, he found 
it puzzling that the coefficients  on cash flow are larger for the mid- 1980s 
than they  are for the late  1980s and early  1990s when the tightness  of 
credit was widely acknowledged. 
Several  panel members observed  that firms can adjust to cash flow 
shocks  along many margins other than inventory  holdings.  Hall noted 
that trade credit was an important source and use of funds and that firms 
can draw cash by "selling" market share. John Shoven asked why firms 
should absorb cash flow shocks in inventories rather than in cash stocks. 
Fazzari agreed that optimal portfolio adjustment should involve changes 
along many margins but emphasized  that inventories  should still be a 
key part of the adjustment. 
Hall suggested testing this by using all the portfolio elements  that are 
decision variables of the firm as dependent variables and using an exoge- 
nous cash or credit shock as the only explanatory variable. 
Although  monetary policy  is often  seen  as the source  of cash  flow 
shocks,  Benjamin Friedman noted that the precise link between  mone- 
tary policy and such shocks  still needs to be isolated.  He suggested that 
the link might be  through higher interest  payments  and self-fulfilling 
fears  of  reduced  profitability.  Fazzari  suggested  that  consumption 
shocks  were  probably a prime source  of cash  flow disturbances.  Al- 
though consumption  is relatively smooth, it is the largest component  of 
aggregate demand, so even small variations can have large cash flow ef- 
fects. 
Anil Kashyap concluded that the importance of credit constraints on 
inventories has been demonstrated strongly enough; the teaching of in- 
ventory theory in graduate school,  which tends to focus only on produc- 
tion smoothing,  should be changed. 134  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
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